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1 Introduction 
Rammsayer and Brandler (2004) showed that various psychophysical timing tasks 
measuring the acuity of temporal information processing can be assigned to a single latent 
variable referred to as temporal resolution power (TRP). It has been shown repeatedly that 
individual differences in TRP are related to individual differences in intelligence (Helmbold & 
Rammsayer, 2006; Rammsayer & Brandler, 2007). That is, individuals with higher TRP showed 
higher scores in psychometric intelligence tests than individuals with lower TRP. However, this 
TRP hypothesis to intelligence is challenged by the fact that the performance on psychophysical 
timing tasks (Brown, 2008b) as well as the performance on psychometric intelligence tests afford 
attention (Carroll, 1993). Hence, the relationship between TRP and intelligence might be 
alternatively explained by attention as common source of variance. However, a systematic 
investigation of the influence of attention on the relationship between TRP and intelligence is 
missing. Consequently, the main objective of the present study is to arrive at a better 
understanding of the interplay among TRP, attention, and intelligence.  
In the first part of the introduction, the concept of intelligence and its structure are 
introduced followed by a brief look at the mental speed approach to intelligence, which 
postulates that individual differences in the speed of information processing account for 
individual differences in intelligence. Subsequent, the concept of TRP is introduced in the 
context of an individual’s sensory discrimination ability followed by a focus on TRP’s 
measurement and its relationship to intelligence. In the second part, the concept of attention as 
limited capacity resource is introduced with its different manifest types and empirical findings on 
the structure of attention are given. Furthermore, empirical evidence for attention’s close 
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relationship with intelligence as well as its role in temporal information processing are presented. 
The third part of the introduction begins with a brief summary of the introduction up to this 
point. Subsequent, the measurement of attention with latency-based elementary cognitive tasks, 
the role of task complexity as experimental manipulation of attention within an elementary 
cognitive task, the operationalization of attention, the challenge posed associated with the 
latency-based operationalization of attention, and the appropriate method to handle this challenge 
are presented. The research questions and related necessary prerequisites are presented in chapter 
2. 
1.1 Intelligence 
Intelligence is one of the oldest and most examined constructs in psychological science. It 
is reliably measured with psychometric intelligence tests (Mackintosh, 2011) and predicts 
socioeconomic success (Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007; Strenze, 2007) as well as 
physical health and mortality (Deary, 2012). According to Gottfredson (1997), no other 
psychological construct has such high predictive validity in relation to job performance. 
Furthermore, more intelligent individuals deal more successfully with the ordinary demands of 
everyday life (e.g., read and understand news articles or maps) than less intelligent individuals 
(Gottfredson, 1997). Despite its importance to everyday life and its influence on political 
agendas or school curricula, it remains a difficulty to define intelligence. Sternberg (2004) 
remarked that “there seem to be almost as many definitions of intelligence as there are experts 
asked to define it” (p. 472). However, many of these expert definitions refer to common 
attributes such as abstract reasoning, problem solving, and decision making as well as the role of 
metacognitive processes (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986). For example, Wechsler (1944) defined 
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intelligence as “the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think 
rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment” (p. 3). Another often discussed topic is 
about the structure of intelligence (Deary, 2012; Sternberg & Detterman, 1986). Is there one 
intelligence or are there many intelligences? A vast amount of data has been collected within 
different theoretical approaches and has been examined factor-analytically to achieve a better 
understanding of the structure of intelligence (Carroll, 1993).  
1.1.1 The structure of intelligence 
Spearman (1904) examined the correlations among various intellectual performance 
measures (e.g., French and Mathematics) and found that these performance measures were 
positively correlated, what is known as positive manifold. Based on this finding, Spearman 
concluded that all kinds of intellectual ability must have a common fundamental factor, some 
sort of mental energy, which Spearman denoted as the general factor of intelligence (g). 
According to Spearman’s two factor theory of intelligence, each particular ability test measures a 
certain portion of g and its own unique factor s, which is specific to that particular ability test and 
independent of g. For example, a mathematical ability test measures a certain portion of g, but 
also the specific knowledge about numbers, which is specific to that mathematical ability test 
and not measured by a verbal ability test. However, according to Spearman, it is g and not s that 
accounts for the positive manifold in any intellectual test battery. In fact, Spearman claimed that 
g is a complete explanation for a positive manifold by means of principal axis factoring 
(Mackintosh, 2011). However, this assumption of g as single source of a positive manifold is 
challenged by the apparent clustering in correlation matrices. That is, a test a might be highly 
correlated with the tests b and c, but only weakly with the tests x, y, and z. On the other hand, a 
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test x might be highly correlated with the tests y and z, but only weakly with the tests a, b, and c. 
Thus, two distinct clusters would be visible in a correlation matrix of the six tests a, b, c, x, y, 
and z. Based on this circumstance, Thurstone (1938) believed that there are several independent 
components of intelligence instead of a single factor like g. In contrast to Spearman, Thurstone 
was primarily interested in factors that accounted for the intercorrelations among the specific 
clusters within a correlation matrix. Therefore, Thurstone developed a factor-analytical approach 
that allowed him to determine the number of latent constructs underlying a correlation matrix. 
The number of factors identified by Thurstone varied, but seven (what he called) Primary Mental 
Abilities (PMAs) were clearly interpretable: verbal comprehension, verbal fluency, number, 
memory, perceptual speed, inductive reasoning, and spatial visualization. In the meanwhile, it is 
clear that Spearman’s two factor theory and Thurstone’s seven PMAs did not contradict each 
other, but are in fact complementary as represented by hierarchical models of intelligence, which 
contain group factors as well as a g factor. For example, Carroll’s (1993) three-stratum model of 
human cognitive abilities comprises three levels of intelligence and represents an amalgamation 
of Spearman’s and Thurstone’s theories. Carroll includes g at the apex of the hierarchy (third 
stratum), eight broad abilities - fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, general memory and 
learning, broad visual perception, broad auditory perception, broad retrieval ability, broad 
cognitive speediness, and processing speed - at the second level (second stratum), and a large 
number of indefinite specific factors at the first level (first stratum). As can be seen in Carroll’s 
three stratum model or in Thurstone’s PMAs, these models include well-known capacity-related 
(e.g., fluid intelligence and reasoning) as well as speed-related aspects of intelligence (e.g., 
processing and perceptual speed).  
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While the multitude of hierarchical models of intelligence differ referred to the lower 
levels of the hierarchy (e.g., in relation to the number of levels or the number of group factors at 
a certain level), there exists broad consensus supporting g at the apex of the hierarchy (Carroll, 
1993; Jensen, 1998a; Johnson & Bouchard, 2005; McGrew, 2009). Empirical evidence for a 
unitary g comes from two studies, which showed virtually perfect correlations among g factors 
extracted from second-order group factors of conceptually different psychometric intelligence 
test batteries (Johnson, Bouchard, Krueger, McGue, & Gottesman, 2004; Johnson, te Nijenhuis, 
& Bouchard, 2008). The advantage of hierarchical modeling is that variance only specific to a 
particular test is filtered out by modeling group factors and, consequently, g modeled based on 
these group factors represents the portion of variance common to all groups/tasks used in the 
respective psychometric test battery. The results of Johnson and her colleagues (2004; 2008) did 
not only show the uniformity of g, but also the consistency of its measurement across different 
psychometric test batteries. According to Jensen and Weng (1994), g is very robust and almost 
invariant across different factor-analytical methods as long as the respective psychometric test 
batteries contain a diverse set of intellectual ability tests. Furthermore, Visser, Ashton, and 
Vernon (2006) showed that a diverse set of intellectual ability tests shared strong loadings on a 
general factor of intelligence, hence, the key requirement for modeling g is not necessarily a 
hierarchical approach of modeling, but a diverse set of intellectual ability tests.  
1.1.2 The mental speed approach to intelligence 
 The investigation of the cognitive and perceptual underpinnings of intelligence has 
always been of particular interest. Already Galton (1883) had the hypothesis that individual 
differences in the speed of information processing (SIP) would be reflected in individual 
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differences in intelligence. Galton believed that the “quickness” of response was an advantage in 
the natural selection (cf. Jensen, 2006). However, Galton was unsuccessful in confirming such a 
relationship due to methodological reasons. For instance, Galton operationalized intelligence as 
an individual’s occupation or, additionally, lacked the appropriate statistical methods to test his 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, Galton notably influenced the individual differences research on 
intelligence up until today and in the meanwhile, Galton’s hypothesis has been confirmed 
repeatedly (Jensen, 2006; Sheppard & Vernon, 2008).  
 The mental speed approach recognizes that SIP accounts for individual differences in 
intelligence. That is, more intelligent individuals show a higher speed of execution of cognitive 
processes than less intelligent individuals, hence, show faster completion of simple cognitive 
tasks. These simple cognitive tasks are denoted as elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs), which 
demand rather low cognitive effort and require only a small amount of cognitive processes to 
arrive at a correct outcome (Carroll, 1993). Due to the simplicity of ECTs, errors tend to be low 
and individual differences are primarily observed in the SIP, that is, in reaction times (RTs). 
Based on an individual’s RT, the time taken by a cognitive process such as stimulus 
apprehension or decision making can be inferred (Jensen, 1998a). One of the most frequently 
used ECTs is the Hick paradigm (Hick, 1952), which assess SIP with a simple and choice RT 
task. In the Hick paradigm, the number of possible stimulus locations is increased systematically 
across several task conditions. In the easiest condition, the simple RT condition, a single 
stimulus location is presented and individuals are supposed to respond as fast as possible to an 
upcoming stimulus by pressing a response button. In the more complex conditions, the choice 
RT conditions, the number of possible stimulus locations is increased so that individuals have to 
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make more and more decisions. For example, in the second condition, two possible stimulus 
locations are presented, while in the third condition, four possible stimulus locations are 
presented, and so forth. Hick (1952) discovered a relationship between the amount of 
information to be processed and RTs. That is, an individual’s RT linearly increased with the 
number of bits of information (i.e., the log2 of the number of possible stimulus locations) to be 
processed. 
 Roth (1964) was the first to relate Hick RT parameters to intelligence and showed that 
the RT-slope across Hick conditions was steeper for less intelligent individuals compared to 
more intelligent individuals. Furthermore, Jensen (1987) showed that the RT-slope as well as 
other Hick parameters (e.g., mean RT or the intercept) are reliably correlated with intelligence. 
Today, a large number of studies show that individual differences in RTs as measured with 
various different ECTs account for individual differences in intelligence (Sheppard & Vernon, 
2008) no matter if speed (Deary, Der, & Ford, 2001; Neubauer & Bucik, 1996) or power tests of 
intelligence (Bors & Forrin, 1995; Neubauer & Bucik, 1996; Neubauer, Riemann, Mayer, & 
Angleitner, 1997; Vernon & Kantor, 1986) were used. Sheppard and Vernon (2008) reviewed 
empirical findings and found a mean correlation coefficient of r = -.24 between intelligence and 
RT (based on 172 studies with a total of 1146 correlation coefficients). The correlations between 
the RTs and intelligence reported by Sheppard and Vernon ranged from r = -.10 up to r = -. 45 
with a trend towards strengthening for more complex ECT conditions. For example, Hick 
conditions containing more bits of information showed stronger correlations with intelligence 
compared to conditions containing less bits (e.g., Jensen, 1987). This phenomena of stronger 
correlations between more complex ECTs conditions and intelligence is known as the complexity 
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hypothesis and has been shown repeatedly (Ackerman & Cianciolo, 2002; Neubauer & Fink, 
2003; Rammsayer & Troche, 2016; Stankov, 2000; Vernon & Jensen, 1984; Vernon & Weese, 
1993). However, there is evidence for an inverted curvilinear trajectory of the correlation 
between RTs and intelligence in relation to task complexity (Borter, 2016; Jensen, 2006; 
Lindley, Wilson, Smith, & Bathurst, 1995). That is, the magnitude of the correlation between 
RTs and intelligence first increases with increasing task complexity, but then decreases if the 
task gets exceedingly complex. Schweizer (1996) showed that a speed-accuracy transition takes 
place when task complexity increases. That is, in exceedingly complex tasks accuracy scores are 
associated with intelligence instead of RTs.  
1.1.3 Sensory discrimination ability 
 Before the invention of psychometric intelligence tests, Spearman (1904) confirmed a 
relationship between sensory discrimination and intelligence with a sample of pupils, whose 
intelligence was rated by their teachers and peers. Spearman showed moderate to strong positive 
correlations between the performance on weight, color, or pitch discrimination tasks and 
intelligence. After the early years of the 20th century, research on sensory discrimination and 
intelligence was neglected and resurged in the last 40 years (for a historical review see Deary, 
1994). In these recent years, sensory discrimination performance in different modalities was 
related to intelligence. For the auditory modality, the performance on duration (Helmbold & 
Rammsayer, 2006; Helmbold, Troche, & Rammsayer, 2006; Rammsayer & Brandler, 2002, 
2007; Troche & Rammsayer, 2009b; Watson, 1991), pitch/frequency (Acton & Schroeder, 2001; 
N. Raz, Willerman, & Yama, 1987), and loudness discrimination tasks (Deary, Bell, Bell, 
Campbell, & Fazal, 2004; Troche & Rammsayer, 2009a) was found to be positively related to 
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intelligence. For the visual modality, the performance on duration (Haldemann, Stauffer, Troche, 
& Rammsayer, 2011, 2012), color (Acton & Schroeder, 2001; Deary et al., 2004), brightness 
(Troche & Rammsayer, 2009a), and line length discrimination tasks (Meyer, Hagmann-von Arx, 
Lemola, & Grob, 2010) was found to be positively related to intelligence. In addition, several 
studies confirmed a positive relationship between the performance on tactile discrimination task 
(such as pressure, texture, and shape discrimination) with intelligence (Li, Jordanova, & 
Lindenberger, 1998; Roberts, Lazar, Pallier, & Dolph, 1997; Stankov, Seizova-Cajić, & Roberts, 
2001).  
 Correlations obtained between single measures of sensory discrimination and intelligence 
are rather low (cf. Acton & Schroeder, 2001; Deary et al., 2004; Rammsayer & Brandler, 2002). 
Already Spearman (1904) had to correct the obtained correlation coefficients for attenuation and 
showed that a factor-analytically derived general discrimination ability factor (GDA) based on 
several indicators of sensory discrimination was related more strongly to g than single indicators 
of sensory discrimination. As a matter of fact, Spearman showed that GDA coincided with g and, 
hence, concluded that sensory functions must represent an essential element of g. In recent years, 
Spearman’s preliminary results on the relationship between GDA and g were confirmed with 
structural equation modeling (SEM) by Deary and colleagues (2004), who showed a near perfect 
correlation (r = .92) between GDA and g. A similar strong correlation (r = .78) between GDA 
and g was found for a sample of children aged between 5 to 10 years (Meyer et al., 2010). These 
studies only used non-temporal sensory discrimination tasks as indicators of GDA, but temporal 
discrimination is of particular significance in the context of sensory discrimination ability for the 
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following two reasons. First, time is not a distinct stimulus as for example a tone or a light, and, 
second, no specific temporal receptor like the known sensory receptor exists (cf. Grondin, 2001).  
 The study by Helmbold, Troche, and Rammsayer (2006) examined the relationship 
between auditory temporal discrimination, pitch discrimination, and g. Temporal and pitch 
discrimination were moderately correlated (r = .41) and both were substantially related to g 
(rtemporal = .43 and rpitch = .39). Furthermore, a standard multiple regression analysis revealed that 
both predictor variables combined explained a substantial portion of overall variance in g (R2 = 
.24). The relatedness and the shared predictive power suggested that temporal and non-temporal 
discrimination ability represent common aspects of sensory acuity. As a matter of fact, 
subsequent SEM studies showed that temporal and non-temporal discrimination tasks can be 
conjoined to a single latent variable of GDA (Troche & Rammsayer, 2009a; Troche, Wagner, 
Voelke, Roebers, & Rammsayer, 2014). The study by Troche and Rammsayer (2009a) showed 
that GDA predicted a substantial portion of variance in capacity- as well as in speed-related 
aspects of intelligence. However, when the latent variable GDA was split into a latent variable of 
temporal and a latent variable of non-temporal discrimination ability (which correlated to r = 
.94), only temporal discrimination ability predicted capacity- as well as speed-related aspects of 
intelligence, whereas non-temporal discrimination ability only predicted capacity- but not the 
speed-related aspects of intelligence. Consequently, despite the high association between 
temporal and non-temporal discrimination ability, the two constructs are still dissociable. The 
relationship between temporal discrimination ability and intelligence is what is known as the 
TRP hypothesis. According to the TRP hypothesis, individuals with higher TRP of the central 
nervous system show not only higher efficiency of information processing, but also faster SIP, 
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what results in higher scores in psychometric intelligence tests (Rammsayer & Brandler, 2002, 
2007). In the past 15 years, the TRP hypothesis received increased interest and was confirmed 
repeatedly (Haldemann et al., 2012; Helmbold, Troche, & Rammsayer, 2007; Rammsayer & 
Brandler, 2002, 2007). In the following two subchapters, the psychophysical timing tasks used as 
indicators of the latent variable TRP are introduced and TRP’s relationship with intelligence is 
presented. 
1.1.3.1 Psychophysical timing tasks as indicators of temporal resolution power 
 Psychophysical timing tasks are used to determine an individual’s timing accuracy by 
computing difference thresholds (sometimes called just noticeable difference), which is a 
fundamental concept within psychophysics and refers to the minimal difference in stimulus 
magnitude needed to successfully discriminate two stimuli (W. H. Ehrenstein & A. Ehrenstein, 
1999). Typical psychophysical timing tasks are interval comparisons, of which Grondin (2010) 
distinguishes two categories: forced choice and single stimulus. In a forced choice setting, 
usually denoted as duration discrimination task, individuals have to judge the duration of two 
successively presented intervals and have to indicate which of the two intervals was longer. The 
intervals differ in the range of milliseconds (ms) to seconds and are either empty (i.e., silent) or 
filled. An auditory empty interval is marked by a brief start and end signal (e.g., white noise 
bursts), whereas an auditory filled interval is presented as one continuous tone. In a classical 
single stimulus task, frequently referred to as temporal generalization task (TG), individuals are 
first familiarized with the duration of a standard interval. Thereafter, individuals have to judge 
whether each subsequent presented interval was of the same duration as the initially familiarized 
standard interval. The base duration might vary in the range of ms to seconds.  
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 The following three psychophysical timing tasks were also frequently examined in the 
context of the TRP hypothesis: temporal-order judgment task (TOJ), rhythm perception task 
(RP), and the auditory flicker fusion frequency task (AFF). In a typical TOJ, individuals are 
confronted with two stimuli that are presented with slightly different onsets and the individuals 
have to judge the temporal order of the two stimuli, that is, which stimulus was presented first. 
The stimuli are often presented bimodal (e.g., a tone and a light). A typical RP requires an 
individual to recognize a slight duration deviation in a temporal pattern such as a periodic click-
to-click interval. These temporal patterns consist of several clicks of identical duration and a 
single empty interval between two clicks slightly deviates in duration from all the other empty 
intervals presented in the given pattern (cf. Rammsayer & Brandler, 2007). A typical AFF 
involves two stimuli that are presented separated by a short interstimulus interval (ISI) in the 
range of a few ms (e.g., in the range of 1 to 40 ms) and individuals have to judge whether the two 
stimuli were perceived as separate or fused events.  
 The five psychophysical timing tasks introduced in the two paragraphs above and their 
according variations (e.g., filled versus empty intervals or ms versus seconds) have been used as 
indicators of TRP, but not all of these indicators showed to be reliable and valid indicators. 
Rammsayer and Brandler (2004) performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with the 
following eight auditory psychophysical timing tasks: duration discrimination with empty 
intervals in the range of ms, duration discrimination with filled intervals in the range of ms and 
seconds, TOJ, TG in the range of ms and seconds, RP, and AFF. Based on the scree plot, the 
EFA revealed a single factor on which all tasks showed substantial loadings except for RP and 
AFF, which showed factor loadings below .25. In addition, when the eigenvalues were 
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considered as determinant of the numbers of factors instead of the scree plot, a second factor was 
suggested, which consisted only of RP, while AFF still did not show a substantial loading on any 
of the two factors. Throughout the TRP literature, RP and AFF show rather weak (and 
sometimes non-significant) correlations with other indicators of TRP and inconsistent factorial 
results (Haldemann et al., 2012; Rammsayer & Brandler, 2002, 2007). Furthermore, RP and AFF 
often show rather weak and sometimes even non-significant correlations with intelligence 
(Haldemann et al., 2012; Helmbold & Rammsayer, 2006; Rammsayer & Brandler, 2002; Troche 
& Rammsayer, 2009a). Already Jensen (1983) failed to support a relationship between a visual 
flicker frequency fusion task and intelligence. For these reasons, the present study did not use RP 
and AFF as indicators of TRP. Based on the successful modeling of TRP in Troche and 
Rammsayer (2009b), duration discrimination with empty intervals (DDE), TG, and TOJ (all in 
the range of ms) were used. 
1.1.3.2 Temporal resolution power and intelligence 
 TRP repeatedly showed moderate to strong correlations with intelligence (Haldemann et 
al., 2012; Helmbold & Rammsayer, 2006; Helmbold et al., 2007; Troche & Rammsayer, 2009a). 
The moderate correlations were shown when only single indicators of intelligence were used 
(e.g., Haldemann et al., 2011, 2012), whereas the strong correlations were shown when g was 
derived from a diverse set of cognitive ability tests (e.g., Helmbold et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
Helmbold and Rammsayer (2006) showed that TRP was related to a speed (r = .36) as well as to 
a power test of intelligence (r = .47). In the same study, a SIP factor derived from a set of 
different Hick RT parameters also showed substantial, albeit lower, correlations with the speed (r 
= -.26) and the power test of intelligence (r = -.28). A stepwise multiple regression analysis 
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revealed that TRP was a more powerful predictor of intelligence than the SIP factor derived. In a 
subsequent SEM study, Helmbold, Troche, and Rammsayer (2007) investigated the predictive 
power of TRP and SIP in relation to g as well as potential mediating effects among these three 
constructs. Specified as unrelated predictors, TRP and SIP predicted substantial portions of 
variance in g (R2TRP = 38.81% and R2SIP = 6.25%). However, when specified as related 
predictors, a substantial correlation between TRP and SIP (r = -.65) was observed, but only TRP 
remained a significant predictor of g (R2TRP = 38.81% and R2SIP = 1.21%). This result indicated 
that the relationship between SIP and g might be (partially) mediated by TRP. In fact, Helmbold, 
Troche, and Rammsayer were able to show that the relationship between SIP and g was 
completely mediated by TRP. This result is in line with previous findings suggesting that TRP is 
a more important predictor of g than mere SIP (cf. Helmbold & Rammsayer, 2006; Rammsayer 
& Brandler, 2007). 
 Troche and Rammsayer (2009b) proposed that higher TRP not only leads to faster SIP, 
but also to more efficient coordination of cognitive processes, thus, to an increased working 
memory (WM) capacity, what consequently should lead to higher scores in psychometric 
intelligence tests. The authors examined whether TRP and WM capacity were independent 
predictors of capacity- as well as speed-related aspects of intelligence or whether the relationship 
between TRP and these two aspects of intelligence was (partially) mediated by WM capacity. 
The results indicated that WM capacity fully mediated TRP’s relationship to both aspects of 
intelligence. However, these results have to be taken with caution since WM capacity and 
capacity-related aspect of intelligence were not clearly dissociable (β = .92). Nevertheless, this 
study first challenged the TRP hypothesis by bringing up the role of attention in the relationship 
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between TRP and intelligence. As known from research on WM, attention is an integral part of 
WM (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kane et al., 2004; Kane & Engle, 2003) and, 
consequently, might have caused the mediating effect between TRP and intelligence. Further 
evidence for that assumption comes from Carroll (1993), who stated that attention is involved in 
all types of cognitive performance. As a result, there might not be a genuine relationship between 
TRP and intelligence due to attention as common source of variance. However, the role of 
attention has never been systematically investigated in the context of the TRP hypothesis. The 
present study aims to approach this gap, but prior to this undertaking, a closer look at the concept 
of attention and its relationship to intelligence as well as temporal information processing is 
necessary.  
1.2 Attention 
Almost any book concerned with the topic of attention cites James (1890) and Pashler 
(1998). James stated that “Every one knows what attention is” (p. 256), while Pashler claimed 
that “no one knows what attention is” (p. 1). These two quotes illustrate the ongoing challenge in 
the research on attention. On the one hand, researchers and laypersons do have a common, albeit 
ordinary, notion of what attention is and do understand each other when referring to it. On the 
other hand, scholarly conceptualizations differ and no clear consensus exists about the nature of 
attention. Hence, two main metaphors are used to guide the cognitive psychology of attention: 
the spotlight metaphor and the limited resource metaphor (Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 2002). 
 The spotlight metaphor describes the selectivity of attention and an individual’s ability to 
focus his/her attention on the relevant. In the words of the spotlight metaphor, attention is the 
light, which is oriented towards a relevant spot and persists on that particular spot. Consequently, 
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only a stimulus in the focus of the spotlight is perceived, while the stimuli in the fringe of the 
spotlight are (temporarily) neglected.  
The limited resource metaphor - not to be confused with filter theories of attention that 
propose a structural bottleneck at different stages of information processing (Broadbent, 1958; 
for a review on filter theories see Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004) - can be traced back to 
Kahneman’s (1973) work on the capacity model of attention. According to Kahneman, each 
individual has a capacity limit in the performance of cognitive processes and this limited 
capacity can be allocated among different concurrent processes. However, the total amount of 
attention that can be deployed at the same time is limited, hence, an individual’s ability to carry 
out multiple cognitive processes simultaneously is restricted. Two types of input are needed for 
the successful completion of a cognitive process: a specific information input to a sensory 
structure and a non-specific input, which Kahneman terms interchangeably attention, effort, or 
capacity. In that sense, attention has a modulatory effect on bottom-up guided information 
processing: to pay attention is to exert mental effort and to invest processing capacity to objects 
and acts (cf. Kahneman, 1973). Therefore, for the present study, attention is conceptualized as 
the investment of limited processing resources. 
In addition, different types of specific input impose different demands on the limited 
capacity resources, hence, a more complex task demands more attention compared to an easy 
task (Stankov & Schweizer, 2007). Consequently, performance in a task fails if there is not 
enough attention to meet task demands or if the available attention is already allocated to other 
specific input. Kahneman’s idea of a unitary limited capacity was advanced by Navon and 
Gopher (1979), who suggested that the human information processing system consists of 
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multiple limited capacities, of which processing resources can be allocated to different inputs 
simultaneously. However, Schweizer, Moosbrugger, and Goldhammer (2005) questioned the 
notion of multiple capacities for two reasons. First, interferences observed in dual-task 
performance challenge the notion of several independent capacities. Second, it can be expected 
that different types of attention measures draw on common capacity resources (e.g., an 
individual’s ability to divide its attention also involves the ability to focus its attention onto 
different sources and to sustain that effort).  
1.2.1 Theoretical approaches to attention 
 Alike intelligence, attention is one of the oldest constructs in psychological science 
dating back to philosophers like Malebranche and Leibniz who were concerned with how 
individuals perceive their environment and how these perceptual events become conscious (for a 
historical review on attention see Vu, 2004). Due to these many years of research on attention, it 
is not surprising that different theoretical approaches and many thereof derived types of attention 
have been proposed. Most types of attention originated from the following two theoretical 
approaches: the Posner-based and the WM-based approach (Moosbrugger, Goldhammer, & 
Schweizer, 2006). 
 Many prevalent types of attention are based on the model put forward by Posner and 
colleagues (Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & Boies, 1971). Posner and Boies (1971) originally 
proposed the three independent components of alertness, selectivity, and processing capacity, 
which to date are referred to as the attentional trinity of the alerting, the orienting, and the 
executive network, respectively (Petersen & Posner, 2012). Alerting is the ability to achieve and 
maintain a state of readiness, while orienting is the ability to select the relevant information from 
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the sensory surplus of information. The types of attention referred to by the executive network 
come by many names as for example supervisory attention, executive attention, conflict 
resolving attention, or attention control, respectively (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, A. Raz, & 
Posner, 2002; A. Raz & Buhle, 2006; Schweizer, 2010). In contrast to the alerting and the 
orienting network, the executive network emphasizes top-down processes of attention such as the 
executive control of perceptual and cognitive processes. Data from imaging studies support the 
attentional trinity (A. Raz & Buhle, 2006). However, these networks are not as independent as 
previously supposed (Fan et al., 2002; A. Raz & Buhle, 2006), suggesting that the different types 
of attention have something in common. 
 Attention as executive control has arisen from research on WM (Moosbrugger et al., 
2006). In the context of WM research, controlled attention is what makes short-term memory 
WM. That is, WM is described as a subset of items that are stored in short-term memory and are 
currently submitted to capacity limited, attention-controlled cognitive processing (Engle et al., 
1999; Schweizer & Moosbrugger, 2004). Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed a model of WM, 
which initially consisted of the following three components: the phonological loop, the 
visuospatial sketchpad, and the central executive. In later advancements of that WM theory, the 
episodic buffer was added as forth component (for an overview see Baddeley, 2012). The central 
executive controls and regulates the coordination of the phonological loop and the visuospatial 
sketchpad, is associated with shifting between different tasks, and concerned with further 
attentional processes such as the inhibition of competing responses. Already from the early 
developments of his theory, Baddeley (1993) saw the central executive as attention controller, 
but, at that time, research on attention was primarily concerned with perceptual processes, while 
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the executive control of information processing was rather neglected. “Fortunately there was one 
exception to this general trend” (Baddeley, 1993, p. 155), which was the supervisory attentional 
system specified in Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model of attention control. Routine activities, 
such as for example talking while walking, are controlled by a so-called contention scheduler, 
which coordinates these routine activities with pre-learned schemata. Therefore, the contention 
scheduler is seen as an automatic attention process, which needs no conscious control. However, 
if an individual is confronted with a novel situation, conscious control is needed and the 
supervisory attentional system takes over to avoid processing errors caused by the interferences 
between the non-routine information and the existing schemata. Today, executive attention is 
seen as key component of WM models (Baddeley, 2012). 
 The present chapter 1.2.1 has shown that attention has a perceptual, bottom-up guided 
aspect and an executive controlled, top-down guided aspect. The former type, perceptual 
attention, refers to attention as perceptual process such as for example orienting towards or 
selecting the relevant information from the surplus of sensory input and, additionally, “the 
appropriate allocation of processing resources to relevant stimuli” (Coull, 1998, p. 344). The 
latter, executive attention, refers to the higher cognitive processes involved in the integration and 
control of the sensory input (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) and is closely related to the concept 
of WM (e.g., Baddeley, 1993; 2012). In the following two chapters, frequently specified types of 
attention with their associated measurement are introduced, followed by a closer look at the 
structure of attention. 
1.2.1.1 Manifest types of attention 
A vast variety of conceptually different types of attention exist. Four types frequently 
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occur throughout the literature with the following or similar denotations: selective-focused 
attention, sustained attention, divided attention, and executive attention (Coull, 1998; Heitz, 
Unsworth, & Engle, 2005; Moosbrugger et al., 2006; Moray, 1969; Pashler, 1998; Petersen & 
Posner, 2012; Robertson & O’Connell, 2010; Van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). For a 
comprehensive overview on different and overlapping types of attention see Schweizer (2010). 
The concept of selective attention and focused attention are inherently linked and 
addressed as selective-focused attention. According to Schweizer (2010), this type of attention 
comes closest to the ordinary meaning of attention (i.e., the spotlight metaphor). The ability to 
select the relevant stimulus from a source of information involves the ability to filter out or 
attenuate the non-relevant information and to allocate the needed processing resources to the 
stimulus in focus (Posner & Boies, 1971). Schweizer (2005) exemplified the importance of 
selective-focused attention: if there would be a state of non-allocation, there would be no 
allocation of processing resource to relevant stimuli or each new stimulus would attract all 
processing resources available. Thus, information processing would be diffuse and in the end 
abortive. In relation to the selectivity aspect of attention, Hoffman and Nelson (1981) used the 
term spatial attention to refer to the process of scanning different regions of the visual field.  
 Types of sustained attention are characterized by considerable cognitive effort that is 
continuously applied over prolonged periods of time. According to Schweizer and colleagues 
(2005), the ability to sustain attention refers to the opposite of attention’s natural state: random 
shifts in attention. Some researchers use the term interchangeably with vigilance (Mirsky, 
Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 1991; Okena, Salinskya, & Elsas, 2006; Sarter, Givens, & 
Bruno, 2001). However, a typical vigilance task is a rather monotonous and undemanding task, 
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which requires the detection of an infrequent stimulus over a period of up to several hours, while 
a sustained attention task does not explicitly differentiate between demanding and undemanding 
task types (Robertson & O’Connell, 2010). A classical vigilance task was designed by 
Mackworth (1948). In Mackworth’s so-called clock test, a black pointer made small jumps 
around a circumference of a blank clock without any scale markings. Occasionally, within a two 
hour period, the pointer made larger jumps upon which the individuals had to push a response 
button. Mackworth showed that the accuracy of signal detection declined after only several 
minutes. In contrast to Mackworth’s clock test, the Continuous Performance Test (CPT; 
Halperin, Sharma, Greenblatt, & Schwartz, 1991; Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, & Beck, 
1956) represents a classical sustained attention task, which involves the ability to maintain 
attention “only” over several minutes by searching for a target stimulus in a sequence of rapidly 
presented target and distractor stimuli. Further frequently used synonyms for sustained attention 
are mental concentration and tonic alertness (Schweizer, 2010; Sturm & Willmes, 2001). In 
comparison to tonic alertness, phasic alertness refers to the ability to increase and maintain 
response readiness over a very short period (Sturm & Willmes, 2001). In an experimental setting, 
phasic alertness is typically induced by an external cue such as for example a fixation cross, 
which directs attention to an impending stimulus. 
 Divided attention is the ability to process voluntarily more than one source of information 
at the time. Thus, divided attention refers to the allocation of specific portions of the limited 
processing resources to several different tasks and, hence, is directly linked to the idea that 
attentional resources are limited (Coull, 1998; Pashler, 1998; Schweizer, 2010). Most typically, 
dual-task studies are used to show how performance in one task decreases due to the increased 
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processing capacity demands required by a second simultaneously performed distractor task. 
Individuals are still highly selective, but in contrast to tasks of selective-focused attention, all 
stimuli presented in a dual-task setting are of relevance and arise from different sources coupled 
with different responses (Van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). Dual-task paradigms are the classical 
approach to investigate Kahneman’s (1973) or Navon and Gopher’s (1979) theories of limited 
capacity/capacities. In applied research settings, tasks of divided attention typically assess the 
effects of multi-tasking such as for example conversing on a cellphone while driving (e.g., 
Strayer & Johnston, 2001). 
 Executive attention, also called executive control (Petersen & Posner, 2012; Schweizer, 
2010) or attention control (Kane & Engle, 2003), refers to the top-down control and regulation of 
information processing (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000) and is conceptually close to 
what Norman and Shallice (1986) specified as the supervisory attentional system. That is, 
executive attention is concerned with conflict resolution and inhibitory control (Fernandez-
Duque et al., 2000; Kane & Engle, 2002, 2003; Moosbrugger et al., 2006). Schweizer (2010) 
points out that information processing must be accompanied by higher mental processing that 
prevents alternative courses of action. As an example, while the primary goal of a task has to be 
achieved, the supervisory system has to resolve response conflicts, especially when habitual 
behaviors conflict with response behaviors associated with the current task. In contrast to more 
perceptual types of attention measures (such as for example the CPT), executive attention is 
measured with tasks that control the subordinate perceptual attention processes such as rapid 
switching between concurrent tasks (Moosbrugger et al., 2006). 
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1.2.1.2 The structure of attention 
  One of the first studies that applied an individual differences approach to investigate the 
structure of attention was by Mirsky and colleagues (1991). Based on 13 different measures of 
attention, Mirsky and colleagues factor-analytically identified four types of attention: focus-
execute, sustain, encode, and shift. Subsequent studies only partially replicated the structural 
model of Mirsky and colleagues (Pogge, Stokes, & Harvey, 1994; Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, 
& Nimmo-Smith, 1996) or even failed to do so (Strauss, Thompson, Adams, Redline, & Burant, 
2000) mainly due to non-representative clinical samples or a questionable selection of 
measurements.  
 Moosbrugger and colleagues (2006) examined 11 latency-based measures of attention 
with a non-clinical sample by means of confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs). The measures of 
attention were selected from a set of validated attention test batteries and were categorized as 
perceptual or as executive measure of attention. Based on that categorization, a latent variable 
perceptual attention was modeled with tasks measuring alertness, sustained attention, focused 
attention, and selection for action, whereas a latent variable executive attention was modeled 
with tasks measuring divided attention, skill-based-interference, behavioral inhibition, action 
planning, and two measures of attention switching (see Model 1 in Figure 1). Model 1 showed a 
satisfactory fit and a strong correlation (r = .66) between the two latent variables perceptual and 
executive attention. To deal with the strong correlation and based on the rationale of a close 
relationship between attention and perception (cf. Broadbent, 1958; Coull, 1998; Schweizer, 
2010), Moosbrugger and colleagues specified a bi-factorial model in which all executive 
measures also loaded on the latent variable of perceptual attention (see Model 2 in Figure 1). The 
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rationale of bi-factorial modeling is to derive a general factor common to all manifest variables 
and a second group factor that accounts for the residual variance in an a priori specified set of 
manifest variables. With this rationale of modeling, the derived factors are independent of each 
other (for a detailed example of bi-factorial modeling in the context of intelligence see Beaujean, 
2015). The bi-factorial attention model specified by Moosbrugger and colleagues represented the 
data well and showed a better fit than the model in which perceptual attention was specified as 
group factor and executive attention as general factor. This second model was modeled based on 
the rationale that all types of attention afford executive control (cf. Heitz et al., 2005). The 
attention models examined by Schweizer and colleagues (Moosbrugger et al., 2006; Schweizer et 
al., 2005) suggest that perceptual and executive attention show a strong overlap caused by the 
fact that all attention measures tap perceptual attention independent of the attention measures 
used. For this reason, the present study pertained attention to perception.  
1.2.2 Attention and intelligence 
 Already early intelligence researchers such as Binet or Spearman recognized the 
important role of attention to intelligence (cf. Heitz et al., 2005). To date, most evidence for a 
close relationship between attention and intelligence is provided by Posner-based and WM-based 
models. From a Posner-based approach, the two models of perceptual and executive attention 
presented in Figure 1 were both related to intelligence (Schweizer, 2010; Schweizer et al., 2005). 
For Model 1, a second-order latent variable of general attention had to be derived from the two 
first-order latent variables perceptual and executive attention to optimize the prediction of 
intelligence. This higher-order latent variable of general attention predicted 32.49% of variance 
in intelligence (Schweizer et al., 2005). If the latent variable of general attention was removed  
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Figure 1. The two models of Moosbrugger, Goldhammer, and Schweizer (2006) representing 
perceptual and executive attention as the latent factors underlying individual differences in 
latency-based measures of attention. Model 1 represents a two factor model with a strong 
correlation of r = .66 between perceptual and executive attention. Model 2 represents the bi-
factorial model with the independent latent variables of perceptual and executive attention. ATT1 
to ATT7 represent executive types of attention measures, whereas ATT8 to ATT11 represent 
perceptual types of attention measures. 
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and the two first-order latent variables were specified as unrelated predictors, only the latent 
variable of executive attention substantially predicted intelligence (K. Schweizer, personal 
communication, November 03, 2016), even though both latent variables investigated individually 
showed to be strong predictors of intelligence (Schweizer, 2010). Consequently, predicting 
intelligence with the two independent first-order latent variables of perceptual and executive 
attention is misleading, because executive attention also taps perceptual aspects of attention and, 
consequently, the predictive influence of perceptual attention on intelligence is concealed. 
Therefore, bi-factorial model (see Model 2 in Figure 1) accounting for the dissociation of 
perceptual and executive attention was related to intelligence showing that perceptual attention 
predicted 17.64% of variance in intelligence compared to 7.29% of variance explained by 
executive attention (Schweizer, 2010). Altogether, from a Posner-based approach, these results 
suggest that attention has to be derived from a higher-order or a bi-factorial model in order to 
obtain a valid structural model of attention (Schweizer, 2010; Schweizer et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, these results of Schweizer and colleagues (2005) suggest that perceptual attention 
is a more important predictor of intelligence than executive attention.  
 In contrast to the Posner-based approach, the WM-based approach assess executive types 
of attention based on WM tasks. That is, executive types of attention are dissociated from other 
WM components by means of SEM and the thereby derived components are related to 
intelligence (Bühner, Krumm, & Pick, 2005; Bühner, Krumm, Ziegler, & Plücken, 2006; Kane et 
al., 2004; Süss, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). For example, Kane and 
colleagues (2004) applied bi-factorial modeling to a diverse set of classical WM span tasks and 
derived three latent variables. A general latent variable of executive attention based on all 
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manifest indicators and two domain-specific storages factors based only on the according set of 
indicators: a group factor of spatial storage and a group factor of verbal storage. The latent 
variable of executive attention explained a substantial portion of variance in g, but only small 
portions in spatial and verbal reasoning ability, of which the domain-specific storage factors 
were better predictors. Kane and colleagues concluded that the aspect of executive attention is 
the main driver of the correlation between WM and general cognitive-ability.  
 Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) also examined the role of attention and WM as 
predictors of intelligence. In contrast to Kane and colleagues (2004), attention and WM were 
assessed with separate measures. That is, attention had not to be dissociated from WM by means 
of bi-factorial modeling. As in line with previous work (e.g., Burns, Nettelbeck, & McPherson, 
2009), Schweizer and Moosbrugger found a close relationship between attention and WM, which 
indicated that measures of WM indeed included a component that is represented by measures of 
attention. However, the two mediation models examined by Schweizer and Moosbrugger showed 
a difference in the prediction of intelligence when measured with a speed or a power test of 
intelligence (see Figure 2). Attention and WM both predicted a substantial portion of variance in 
intelligence when measured with a power test compared to the finding that only attention 
substantially predicted intelligence when measured with a speed test. Consequently, WM might 
be especially involved in the processing of highly cognitive demanding psychometric 
intelligence test, whereas attention is the main processing resource when working on a 
psychometric intelligence test with lower task demands. According to Schweizer and 
Moosbrugger, this result suggests that the contribution of attention and especially WM depends 
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on task demands required, but only attention being involved in all cognitive processing no matter 
of task demands required. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.3 Attention and temporal information processing 
 To date, the relationship between attention and TRP has not been examined. Therefore, 
insights are presented from the perspective of temporal information processing. There are two 
main paradigms used to assess temporal information processing: the prospective and the 
retrospective paradigm (Grondin, 2010). In prospective timing tasks, individuals know that the 
task will be about time in advance and attention-based models are often considered to explain 
prospective timing performance, whereas in retrospective timing tasks, individuals do not know 
in advance that the task will be about time and memory-based models are considered to explain 
retrospective timing performance (Block & Zakay, 1997; Grondin, 2010). In the present study, 
Figure 2. A simplified illustration of the two mediator models of attention, working memory, 
and intelligence as specified by Moosbrugger and Schweizer (2004). The latent variable of 
intelligence was either a speed or a power test of intelligence. 
*p < .05. 
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only prospective timing tasks are used. For more details and a review on both paradigms see 
Block and Zakay (1997). 
 The role of limited processing resources in temporal information processing is often 
examined with dual-task performance and its associated interference effect, which refers to the 
disruption in timing performance in a primary task caused by a secondary distractor task (Brown, 
2008b). In a typical dual-task setting individuals simultaneously work on a timing task and a 
distractor task, either being another timing task or some non-temporal task (e.g., a visual search 
task or mental arithmetics). As a result of the additional processing resource required by the 
distractor task, the timing performance in the primary task is affected in such a way that time 
judgments become shorter, more variable, and more inaccurate as if when compared to a single-
task setting, in which individuals only work on one timing task at the time (Brown, 1997, 2006, 
2014; Casini & Macar, 1997; Coull, Vidal, Nazarian, & Macar, 2004). According to Brown’s 
(2008b) review based on 55 empirical articles, 70 experiments out 77 (91%) showed an 
interference effect with various different distractor tasks used.  
 Several methodological variations of dual-task settings exist, showing the robustness of 
the interference effect. For example, cognitively more demanding distractor tasks afford more 
processing resources and consequently fewer processing resources are available for the primary 
timing task. For example, Zakay, Nitzan, and Glicksohn (1983) had individuals reproduce a 
duration of an interval during which they solved a verbal distractor task with three different 
complexity conditions. In the easiest condition, individuals had to simply read out a presented 
word. In the intermediate condition, individuals had to name pictures of various objects 
presented. In the most complex condition, individuals had to provide a synonym for a presented 
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word. Zakay and colleagues found that time estimation is a decreasing function of the distractor 
task’s complexity (i.e., the more complex the distractor task the shorter the reproduced time 
estimate). Several other studies provide evidence for a stronger interference effect when 
complexity of the distractor task is increased (Brown, 1997; Brown & Boltz, 2002; Hicks, Miller, 
Gaes, & Bierman, 1977; Zakay & Shub, 1998). A meta-analytical review of Block, Hancock, and 
Zakay (2010) confirmed that the prospective duration judgment ratio (i.e., the subjective time 
estimate gets shorter compared to the actual objective duration) decreases if the complexity of 
the distractor task increases. However, the interference effect is weakened if the primary timing 
task (Brown, 2008a) or the secondary distractor task (Brown & Bennett, 2002) require fewer 
processing resources due to pre-experimental practice of the respective task.    
 Further evidence comes from studies explicitly manipulating attention, by either cueing 
the focus of attention or by asking individuals to devote specific amounts of attention to one of 
the two tasks applied in a dual-task setting. For example, Mattes and Ulrich (1998) presented one 
of two possible stimulus durations either to the auditory or to the visual modality and used cues 
to indicate the modality of the impending stimulus duration. The cues were either valid, 
indicating the correct modality of presentation, or invalid, indicating the wrong modality of 
presentation. The main finding was that individuals perceived the validly cued stimulus durations 
as longer as compared to the invalidly cued stimulus durations, in which the duration was 
perceived as being shorter. The finding by Mattes and Ulrich was in line with findings on the 
interference effect that also showed that durations are perceived as shorter when processing 
resources have to be shared between concurrent tasks (e.g., Brown, 2008b). Evidence for the role 
of attentional sharing comes from studies in which individuals are instructed to allocate specified 
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amounts of processing resources to one of the two concurring tasks. Grondin and Macar (1992) 
had individuals judge the duration and the intensity of a comparison tone to a standard tone. The 
individuals were instructed to allocate more attention either to the duration or to the intensity of 
the tone. The results showed that when more attention was allocated to the duration, the duration 
discriminability was increased, whereas the intensity discriminability was decreased. The 
opposite pattern resulted when more attention was devoted to the intensity. Consequently, fewer 
processing resources allocated to the timing task resulted in a poorer temporal resolution, hence, 
in a decreased precision of timing. This effect of attentional sharing was replicated repeatedly 
(Coull et al., 2004; Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 1994). 
 The fact that most types of distractor tasks interfere with timing performance in the 
primary task is explained with resource-based theories of information processing, which claim 
that monitoring time (in passing) is a cognitive task that demands limited processing resources 
(Brown, 1997; Casini & Macar, 1997; Hicks et al., 1977). So far, most of these dual-task studies 
presented were concerned with timing performance in the range of seconds. However, 
Rammsayer and Lima (1991) and Rammsayer and Ulrich (2011) showed that the processing of 
durations in the range of ms (i.e., 50 ms to 100 ms) was not influenced by cognitive distractor 
tasks suggesting that timing accuracy in the range of ms requires primarily perceptual processes 
compared to the processing of durations in the range of seconds, which requires processes at a 
more cognitive level. This finding was in line with Michon (1985), who suggested that temporal 
processing of brief intervals is rather of perceptual nature and, hence, not accessible to cognitive 
control. However, Rammsayer and Ulrich (2005) showed that the timing performance in the 
range of ms can be influenced by a cognitive distractor task.  
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1.3 Purpose of the present study 
 In summary, the TRP hypothesis refers to the idea that TRP represents a basic process of 
the central nervous system that accounts for the speed and the efficiency of information 
processing and, thus, underlies individual differences in intelligence. Previous studies repeatedly 
reported this functional relationship irrespective of measures used to assess TRP or intelligence 
(Haldemann et al., 2012; Helmbold & Rammsayer, 2006; Helmbold et al., 2007; Rammsayer & 
Brandler, 2007). However, the TRP hypothesis is challenged by the fact that the performance on 
psychophysical timing tasks as well as the performance on psychometric intelligence tests 
requires attentional resources (Brown, 2008b; Carroll, 1993; Schweizer et al., 2005). Therefore, 
the as hitherto considered genuine relationship between TRP and intelligence could be 
alternatively explained by attention as common source of variance. However, an explicit 
investigation of the interplay between TRP, attention, and intelligence is missing. Therefore, the 
present study aims to arrive at a better understanding of the potential mediating role of attention 
in the relationship between TRP and intelligence.  
As presented in the introduction on attention, different conceptualizations of attention and 
multiple measures do exist. According to Rapp (1982), this versatility of attention comes from 
the fact that attention is a hypothetical construct that cannot be directly observed and is not a 
distinct function clearly detachable from other psychological functions. In fact, attention is 
always bonded to perceptual and cognitive processes in that manner that the allocation of 
processing resources increases their efficiency (Kahneman, 1973; Rapp, 1982). For the present 
study, based on Kahneman (1973) and Schweizer and colleagues (Moosbrugger et al., 2006; 
Schweizer et al., 2005), attention is defined as the appropriate allocation of limited processing 
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resources in stimulus-driven information processing (see also Coull, 1998; Schweizer, 2010). In 
other words, perceptual attention (in the sense of Moosbrugger et al., 2006) is seen as the major 
source of efficiency in bottom-up information processing. Since it is plausible to assume that 
timing performance in the range of ms primarily requires perceptual processes (e.g., Michon, 
1985), perceptual types of attention might be the most likely candidates for the mediation of the 
relationship between TRP and intelligence. In the following, the measurement of perceptual 
attention is considered in detail.  
1.3.1 Measuring attention with elementary cognitive tasks: the role of task complexity 
As previously introduced, ECTs demand rather low cognitive effort, require only a small 
amount of cognitive processes to arrive at a correct outcome, errors tend to be low, and 
individual differences are primarily observed in RTs (Carroll, 1993; Jensen, 1998a). To examine 
a cognitive process of interest with an ECT, several conditions are needed, none of them 
uniquely identify the effect of the cognitive process under study, but taken together define such 
an effect (Pachella, 1974). For the purpose of identifying the effect of perceptual attention in an 
ECT, complexity has to be manipulated across several conditions of an ECT based on the 
rationale that less complex conditions place lower demands on information processing, whereas 
more complex conditions place higher demands on information processing (Stankov & 
Schweizer, 2007). Therefore, the manipulation of complexity is directly linked to attention since 
higher task demands require more of the limited processing resources, hence, an increase in 
complexity should lead to prolonged processing what is visible in an increase of RTs across ECT 
conditions. According to Jensen (2006, 2011), complexity refers to the amount of information to 
be processed, which can be the number of cognitive steps required by an individual to achieve a 
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correct response, the number of elements an individual has to attend to, the degree of stimulus-
response compatibility, or the amount of prior-learned information that has to be retrieved from 
memory (see also Spilsbury, Stankov, & Roberts, 1990; Stankov & Crawford, 1993).  
Together with the manipulation of complexity, the speed-accuracy transition (Schweizer, 
1996) has to be considered, because the correlation between RT and intelligence diminishes 
when a task gets exceedingly complex (Borter, 2016; Jensen, 2006; Lindley et al., 1995). 
Furthermore, very complex tasks tap different cognitive processes such as WM and individual 
differences are rather observed in the number of correct responses (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, 
Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Kane et al., 2004; Stankov & Schweizer, 2007; Süss et al., 2002). 
Task assessing perceptual types of attention are rather less complex and individual differences 
are primarily observed in RTs (Schweizer, 2010; Stankov & Schweizer, 2007). In the following, 
the three ECTs used to assess perceptual attention are presented.  
1.3.2 Operationalization of attention 
For the present study, the Hick paradigm, the Flanker task, and the CPT were used as 
measures of perceptual attention, each consisting of three conditions differing in complexity. The 
Hick paradigm and the Flanker task were operationalized as phasic measures, in which a cue 
disclosed the impending stimulus. The Hick paradigm was used as measure of selective-focused 
attention (Schöttke, Matthes-von Cramon, & von Cramon, 1993), in which complexity was 
manipulated by increasing the number of possible stimulus locations across conditions. Previous 
studies showed that RTs increase along with the number of possible stimulus locations (e.g., 
Jensen, 1987; Neubauer et al., 1997; Sleimen-Malkoun, Temprado, & Berton, 2013). 
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The Flanker task was used as measure of selective-focused attention and behavioral 
inhibition (B. A. Eriksen & C. W. Eriksen, 1974; Pashler, 1994). Complexity was manipulated 
by increasing the demands put on the focus aspect of selective-focused attention with a transition 
from focusing to behavioral inhibition from the second to the third condition. In the first 
condition, two different target stimuli were alternately presented in the center of the screen, both 
indicating a directional response (i.e., left or right). However, the individual had to respond the 
same way to both stimuli neglecting the irrelevant directional information. In the second 
condition, the target stimulus afforded the directional response. In the third condition, an 
individual’s ability to inhibit an inappropriate response induced by interfering information was 
manipulated. Again, the target stimulus afforded a directional response (i.e., left or right) and 
each target stimulus was either flanked by non-target stimuli corresponding to the directional 
response indicated by the target stimulus (congruent trials) or corresponding to the opposite 
directional response not indicated by the target stimulus (incongruent trials). Therefore, the 
individual had to focus on the center stimulus, while inhibiting or responding to the automatic 
response activated by the flanker stimuli. Congruent and incongruent trials were mixed in order 
to keep complexity at a high level. Incongruent trials typically show a response slowing due to 
increased demands of inhibitory control (Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, Band, & Bashore, 1997; 
Scheres et al., 2003).  
Sustained attention was assessed with the CPT, one of the most popular clinical measures 
of sustained attention (for a comprehensive review see Riccio, Reynolds, Lowe, & Moore, 2002). 
The CPT is an experimenter-paced ECT in which individuals monitor a rapid sequence of several 
different stimuli and have to respond whenever a previously defined imperative stimulus 
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appears. Complexity was manipulated by increasing the number of distractors presented across 
conditions. The first condition was rather a simple RT condition, in which only the imperative 
stimulus was presented repeatedly without distractor stimuli, hence, complexity was kept at a 
minimal level (cf. Schweizer, 1996). In the second and third condition, complexity was increased 
by adding distractors into the sequence of imperative stimuli. In order to increase complexity 
from the second to the third condition, a new imperative stimulus was determined and the 
imperative stimulus of the second condition was added as distractor stimulus to the set of 
distractor stimuli in the third condition. Therefore, the third condition also measured inhibitory 
control of a previously habituated response in addition to sustained attention. In comparison to 
the Hick paradigm and the Flanker task, which demanded only phasic alertness, the CPT 
required individuals to sustain their attention continuously (i.e., tonic alertness) at a very high 
level in order to detect the imperative stimuli. There was no mean of compensation for missed 
stimuli. 
All three ECTs with their according complexity manipulation are described in more detail 
in the method subchapters 3.3.1 to 3.3.3. In addition, the manipulation of complexity will be 
tested and discussed.  
1.3.3 The impurity problem 
It is difficult to decide whether the correlations observed between latency-based measures 
of attention and intelligence are caused by better attention or by faster SIP in individuals with 
higher intelligence. Krumm, Schmidt-Atzert, Michalczyk, and Danthiir (2008) showed that it is 
difficult to disentangle a latent variable assessing sustained attention from a latent variable 
assessing SIP. This problem becomes especially evident by the fact that identical measures are 
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used to assess attention and SIP (Krumm et al., 2008; Schweizer, 2010; Schweizer et al., 2005). 
For example, the Hick paradigm, one of the most frequently used measures of SIP (Jensen, 2006; 
Sheppard & Vernon, 2008), is also used as measure of selective-focused attention in the research 
on schizophrenia and traumatic brain injuries (Schöttke et al., 1993). Based on this confound, 
some authors claimed that tasks assessing SIP correlate with intelligence to that extent with 
which they tap attention (Heitz et al., 2005; Stankov & Roberts, 1997; Wilhelm & Schulze, 
2002). There is good evidence for the notion that SIP is more strongly correlated with 
intelligence when measured with complex rather than simple task conditions (Ackerman & 
Cianciolo, 2002; Neubauer & Fink, 2003; Rammsayer & Troche, 2016; Stankov, 2000; Vernon 
& Jensen, 1984; Vernon & Weese, 1993). Recently, Schweizer (2010) suggested that the 
allocation of processing resources is accompanied by the recruitment of additional neurons of the 
brain in order to improve performance in any given cognitive task. Speed of these neurons or 
neuronal networks is referred to as attention-paced speed (Schweizer, 2010) and may be 
functionally dissociable from residual speed, which is the speed associated with all other 
processes independent of the experimental manipulation of attention. Schweizer concluded that 
"attention-paced speed is a major source of the correlation between processing speed […] and 
intelligence" (p. 256). Therefore, latency-based measures of attention (or any other cognitive 
process supposed to be measured) are confounded by the different underlying processes 
contributing to a RT composite.  
Schweizer (2007) referred to this confounding effect of different underlying cognitive 
processes in cognitive performance measures as the impurity problem. In fact, research within 
experimental cognitive psychology showed that latency-based performance in any cognitive task 
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is a composite measure of the time taken by a number of different cognitive processes involved 
in the completion of that given task (Jensen, 1982, 1998b; Luce, 1986; J. Miller & Ulrich, 2013; 
Van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). The impurity problem can be partly avoided by several 
provisions in the experimental design: control for movement times (Jensen & Munro, 1979), 
establishment of stimulus-response compatibility (Alluisi & Warm, 1990), or avoiding 
(motivational) feedback (Neubauer, Bauer, & Höller, 1992). However, these provisions are not 
sufficient enough to curtail all unintended sources of variance and, hence, a statistical approach 
is needed to dissociate variance caused by the experimental manipulation from residual variance 
independent of the experimental manipulation. 
1.3.4 Fixed-links modeling 
Schweizer (2006a, 2006b, 2008) introduced fixed-links modeling (FLM) as a statistical 
approach to cope with the impurity problem inherent in all cognitive performance measures. 
FLM is a kind of SEM and represents a special form of CFA for experimental repeated-
measurement designs. As an advantage over manifest approaches, FLM exclusively considers 
the true variance shared by several manifest variables as represented by latent variables. Most 
FLM studies propose to decompose variance into two components: an experimental latent 
variable, representing individual differences in processes directly affected by the different levels 
of the experimental manipulation, and a non-experimental latent variable, representing individual 
differences in the processes that remain constant irrespective of the experimental manipulation 
(Schweizer, 2006b). Therefore, the experimental and non- experimental latent variable are 
expected to be independent. In order to extract these two latent variables from the same set of 
manifest variables, fixation of factor loadings is required. The factor loadings of the 
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experimental latent variable are fixed in accordance to the theoretically expected trajectory 
caused by the experimental manipulation (e.g., an increasing trajectory across task conditions), 
whereas all factor loadings of the non-experimental latent variable are fixed to the same value 
indicating consistency across treatment levels (see Figure 3 for an example of a fixed-links 
model). Given that all factor loadings are fixed and not estimated, variance of a latent variable is 
set free and needs to reach statistical significance in order to be interpreted as psychologically 
meaningful. Insignificant fixed-links variables are removed from the model and the revised 
models are used for the further analyses (cf. Wang, Ren, Li, & Schweizer, 2015). 
FLM has been successfully applied to decompose experimental from non-experimental 
variance for cognitive processes such as working memory- (Schweizer, 2007; Stankov & 
Schweizer, 2007; Thomas, Rammsayer, Schweizer, & Troche, 2015; Wang, Ren, Altmeyer, & 
Schweizer, 2013; Wang et al., 2015), memory- (R. Miller, Rammsayer, Schweizer, & Troche, 
2010; Stauffer, Troche, Schweizer, & Rammsayer, 2014), and attention-related phenomena (Ren, 
Schweizer, & Xu, 2013; Wagner, Rammsayer, Schweizer, & Troche, 2014, 2015). For the 
present study, it is expected that experimentally caused variance representing the increased 
attentional demands can be decomposed from non-experimental variance representing all other 
residual processes not influenced by the experimental manipulation of complexity. Hence, the 
experimental latent variable is supposed to represent attention-paced speed variance, whereas the 
non-experimental latent variable is supposed to represent residual speed variance, which is a 
conglomerate of all process untouched by the experimental manipulation of complexity. 
Therefore, the non-experimental latent variable cannot be unambiguously identified and has to 
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be interpreted in the context of the study’s results and its nomological network (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). 
 
  
Non-
experimental 
variable
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0
Figure 3. Illustration of an exemplary fixed-links model 
based on three manifest indicator variables (conditions 1 
to 3). The non-experimental latent variable represents 
variance equally contained in all three conditions, hence, 
its factor loadings are fixed to the same value (i.e., 1). The 
experimental latent variable represents the variance 
caused by the experimental manipulation, hence, its factor 
loadings are fixed to the theoretically expected trajectory 
caused by the experimental manipulation. For example, 
an increasing trajectory would comprise the following 
fixation of factor loadings: a < b < c. 
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2 Research questions 
 The present study focuses on two research questions and the thereby associated necessary 
prerequisites. Research question 1 (RQ1) has a replicative character: can the relationship 
between TRP and g be replicated? Based on the previous findings of a robust relationship 
between TRP and g (e.g., Rammsayer & Brandler, 2007), it is expected that this relationship can 
be replicated in the present study. For the purpose of answering RQ1, two prerequisites have to 
be fulfilled. First, TRP needs to be successfully modeled based on the psychophysical timing 
tasks DDE, TG, and TOJ, as in the study by Troche and Rammsayer (2009b). Second, g needs to 
be successfully modeled based on a diverse set of cognitive ability tests provided by a modified 
short version of the Berlin Intelligence Structure (BIS) test (Jäger, Süss, & Beauducel, 1997; 
Wicky, 2014). However, both latent variables consist of three indicators, thus, represent perfect 
identified measurement models which yield a trivial fit (Kline, 2011). Therefore, the manifest 
indicators of each construct need to coercively show a positive manifold in order to be reducible 
to a single factor (Gignac, 2007; Jensen, 1998a). 
 Research question 2 (RQ2) is concerned with the role of perceptual attention in the 
context of the TRP hypothesis by clarifying its potential mediating role: is the relationship 
between TRP and g of genuine nature or does perceptual attention account for the formation of 
this relationship? For the purpose of answering RQ2, four prerequisites have to be fulfilled. First, 
the previous finding of a relationship between TRP and intelligence has to be replicated. That is, 
RQ1 has to be confirmed. Second, it has to be verified that the experimental manipulation of 
complexity worked. Third, a statistically significant experimental latent variable representing 
perceptual attention needs to be identified for each ECT by means of theory-driven FLM. For 
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this purpose, the fixation of factor loadings for the experimental latent variable needs to be 
chosen in accordance with the expected increase of complexity across ECT conditions and the 
thereby associated increased attentional demands on the limited processing resources. For each 
ECT, the non-experimental latent variable is only considered for further analyses if statistically 
meaningful. Fourth, based on the three experimental latent variables identified for each ECT, a 
higher-order latent variable needs to be modeled representing the perceptual aspects of attention 
common to all ECTs. The same higher-order modeling approach will be conducted for the 
significant non-experimental latent variables (see Figure 4 for an illustration of the higher-order 
modeling of perceptual attention). However, as introduced, it has to be considered that the 
content of the higher-order non-experimental latent variable cannot be determined a priori due to 
its ambiguous conglomerate character. It is only known that the non-experimental latent 
variables represent a latency-based conglomerate of all processes independent of the 
experimental manipulation of complexity. Therefore, the exploratory results associated with the 
higher-order non-experimental latent variable are discussed cautiously. If all four prerequisites 
are fulfilled, RQ2 can be addressed by up to date bootstrapped mediation analysis (e.g., B. O. 
Muthén, L. K. Muthén, & Asparouhov, 2016) further described in chapter 4.4.3 of the results. 
Three potential findings might result from the mediation analysis. First, perceptual attention 
might fully mediate the relationship between TRP and g, which would strongly question the 
validity of the TRP hypothesis. Second, perceptual attention might not mediate the relationship, 
hence, the relationship between TRP and g can be considered genuine in nature. The third 
possibility is that the relationship between TRP and g is partially mediated by perceptual 
attention. Considering these three possible findings, the one found will be discussed in detail.  
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Figure 4. An illustration of the higher-order modeling approach to perceptual attention. For 
each ECT used (i.e., the Hick paradigm, the Flanker task, and the Continuous Performance 
Test) an experimental latent variable representing attention is dissociated from a residual non-
experimental latent variable representing the non-experimental processes. For example, the 
factor loadings of the non-experimental Hick variable (HNEXP) are all fixed to the same value 
(i.e., 1), whereas the factor loadings of the experimental Hick variable (HEXP) are fixed to the 
theoretically expected increasing trajectory (i.e., a < b < c). Analog modeling is used for the 
other two ECTs. Based on all three experimental variables (i.e., HEXP, FEXP, and CEXP) 
dissociated, a higher-order experimental variable (EXP) is modeled to represent perceptual 
attention. The non-experimental variables (HNEXP, FNEXP, and CNEXP) are only modeled as a 
higher-order non-experimental variable (NEXP) if considered as statistically meaningful, 
hence, all variables and paths associated with the non-experimental variables are depicted in 
light grey within Figure 4.  
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3 Method 
3.1 Subjects 
A total of 243 subjects participated in the study. Ten subjects had to be removed due to 
incorrect test behavior, misunderstanding of the instructions, or exceeding the predefined age-
range of 18 to 30 years (see Appendix A for details) and another five subjects were removed due 
to interindividual outlier correction as reported in the results (chapter 4.1). The sample used for 
the analyses consisted of 118 women and 110 men ranging in age from 18 to 30 years (mean and 
standard deviation of age: 22.03 ± 2.94 years). One hundred and thirty-one subjects were from an 
academic background and 97 subjects were from a vocational background (i.e., subjects with or 
in an apprenticeship, but without higher education). For a more detailed description of the 
sample see Appendix B. All subjects reported normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. As gratification students received three participation credits for their Bachelor course 
“Methods II: Experimental Practice”, whereas all other subjects were paid 45.00 Swiss franc. 
Each subject was informed about the study protocol and gave his/her written informed consent. 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee. 
3.2 Assessment of psychometric intelligence 
Psychometric intelligence was assessed with the BIS test (Jäger, Süss, & Beauducel, 
1997) based on Jäger’s (1984) BIS model of intelligence, which classifies cognitive abilities with 
respect to two facets: the mental operation (processing capacity, processing speed, memory, and 
creativity) required and the content (figural, verbal, and numeric) processed (see Figure 5). The 
cross-classification of the two facets (4 operations × 3 contents) results in 12 modal cells, one for 
every operation-content-combination and each represented by at least three subtests in the full 
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version of the BIS test. The original BIS short version includes 15 of the full version’s 45 
subtests. For the present study, a modified short version was used based on an unpublished 
master thesis (Wicky, 2014). In comparison to the original short version, all creativity subtests 
were removed and one subtest was added to each processing speed and memory cell, otherwise 
processing capacity would have been overrepresented with two subtests for each content. A 
description of the 18 subtests used is given in Table 1, in which the abbreviations of the added 
processing speed and memory subtests are supplemented with the letter n (e.g., RZn). The six 
added subtests were selected based on reliability analyses and duration of completion. Wicky 
(2014) reported internal consistencies (Cronbach’s α), test-retest reliabilities (rtt), and composite 
reliabilities as measured with McDonald’s (1999) omega (Ω) for processing capacity (α = .73, rtt 
= .64, and Ω = .79), processing speed (α = .70, rtt = .85, and Ω = .58), and memory (α = .69, rtt = 
.86, and Ω = .63). The internal consistency for processing capacity reported in the original short 
version is α = .51. Several studies showed that g can be extracted based on modified BIS short 
versions (Beauducel & Kersting, 2002; Süss et al., 2002; Valerius & Sparfeldt, 2014). 
After a general instruction to get familiar with the whole procedure, the experimenter 
guided the subjects through the entire assessment according to the standardized guidelines of the 
BIS manual. The following working utensils were provided by the experimenter: the test booklet 
of the original short version with creativity subtests crossed out, a customized test booklet with 
the six added subtests, an envelope, and a pen. Subjects first solved the warm-up subtest 
fragmentary words (UW) followed by the 18 subtests used for the later analyses. In Table 1 all 
subtests are listed in order of administration with the process time allowed and the number of 
items contained. The raw scores were z-standardized since the number of items vary in a broad 
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range from six items in the Charkow (CH) subtest to 130 items in the crossing letters (BD) 
subtest and, in addition, the BIS manual provides no norms for the modified short version as well 
as for the age range of the present sample.  
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Figure 5. Berlin Intelligence Structure (BIS) model based on Jäger 
(1984), which classifies cognitive abilities with respect to two 
facets: mental operations (processing capacity, processing speed, 
memory, and creativity) and contents (figural, verbal, and 
numeric). The cross-classification of the two facets (4 operations 
× 3 contents) results in 12 modal cells, one for every operation-
content-combination and each represented by at least three 
subtests in the full version of the BIS test. 
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Table 1
Subtest (abbreviation) Description Operation Content
Process time 
allowed
Number of 
items
Fragmentary words (UV) Complete missing letter in words S V 0:50  57
City map (OG) Recall of buildings in a city map M F 1:30 + 1:40  27
Number sequences (ZN) Completion of number sequences C N 3:50   9
Figural analogies (AN) Geometric analogies of the form A:B = C:? C F 1:45   8
X-larger (XG) Cross numbers that are x greater than the prior number S N 1:00  44
Verbal analogies (WA) Completion of word analogies C V 1:30   8
Paired associates (ZP) Memorize pairs of numbers M N 2:00 + 2:00  12
Fact-opinion (TM) Decide whether fact or opinion C V 1:00  16
Crossing letters (BD) Cross specific letter in line of letters S F 0:50 130
Estimation (SC) Estimation of complex arithmetics C N 2:45   7
Story (ST) Recall of story information M V 1:00 + 2:00  22
Charkow (CH) Completion of figure sequences C F 3:00   6
Part-whole (TG) Cross word in part-whole relation to prior word S V 0:40  22
Math operators (RZn) Complete simple math equations S N 0:50  20
Word memory (WMn) Memorize random words M V 0:40 + 1:30  20
Word classification (KWn) Classification of words (flowers) S V 0:30  40
Two-digit numbers (ZZn) Memorize set of two-digit numbers M N 1:00 + 0:50  16
Old English (OEn) Cross letters of typeface Old English S F 0:30  56
Routes memory (WEn) Memorize city route M F 0:30 + 0:40  31
BIS subtests (with abbreviation) used in order of administration, supplemented by a brief description, the corresponding operation and 
content facet, the process time allowed, and the number of items contained
Note. Memorizing time and maximal allowed completion time are given for all memory subtests (e.g., 1:30 + 1:40). English subtest names, abbreviations, 
and descriptions are based on Süss and Beauducel (2015). C = processing capacity; S = processing speed; M = memory; F = figural; V = verbal; N = 
numeric. 
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3.3 Experimental tasks: General apparatus, stimuli, and procedure 
 The following eight experimental tasks were administered: Hick, Flanker, CPT, SWAPS, 
DDE, TG, TOJ, and inspection time (IT). SWAPS (Stankov, 2000) and IT (Vickers, Nettelbeck, 
& Willson, 1972) were administered to answer future research questions not object of the present 
study, thus, these two tasks are not described in further detail. 
 Two working stations were used for the administration of the experimental tasks. 
Working station A was used for the administration of all tasks except TOJ, which was 
administered at working station B. At working station A, sitting distance to the 18" Samsung 
SyncMaster 900SL monitor was 55 cm. The display refresh rate was set to 75 Hz. A Dell 
OptiPlex 760 computer with E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2012) installed was used for 
task administration. A Cedrus response pad (model RB-830) was used to record the responses, 
which were logged with an accuracy of ± 1 ms. Loud speakers (Dell model A225) or headphones 
(Sennheiser model HD 555) were used to present the auditory stimuli. All auditory stimuli and 
feedback tones were presented with 70 decibel (dB). All visual stimuli as well as all the 
instructions were presented white on black screen. In all tasks, the instructions had to be repeated 
to the experimenter. Task-specific information about apparatus and stimuli are reported in the 
respective task’s chapter. Working station B is only used for the administration of TOJ, hence, 
apparatus and stimuli are reported in the TOJ chapter 3.3.6.  
 All subjects received a general instruction to get familiar with the apparatus and the 
overall procedure. The eight experimental tasks were combined into two blocks of 
administration, one block consisted of Hick, Flanker, CPT, and SWAPS, whereas the other block 
consisted of DDE, TG, TOJ, and IT. The task sequence within each block was balanced with a 
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Latin square to avoid position effects (Bradley, 1958). In addition, the block sequence was 
balanced as well, resulting in 32 different conditions. Breaks were administered after every two 
tasks in order to avoid fatigue effects. 
3.3.1 Hick paradigm  
Apparatus and stimuli 
Working station A was used for task administration. Stimuli were rectangles (1.6 cm × 
1.4 cm) and plus signs (0.5 cm × 0.5 cm). A feedback tone (1,000 Hz) with a duration of 200 ms 
was used. In the first condition (H0), one rectangle was presented. In the second condition (H1), 
two rectangles were presented 3 cm apart of each other. In the third condition (H2), four 
rectangles were used. The lower two rectangles were presented 1.1 cm apart of each other, while 
the upper two rectangles were presented 3.6 cm apart of each other. The space between the lower 
and upper two rectangles was 1.4 cm. Stimulus presentation, trial sequence, and response pad 
setup (with the corresponding finger placement) are presented in Figure 6. 
Procedure 
In H0, each trial started with the presentation of a rectangle in the center of the screen 
(except for the first trial, which started after a 1,000 ms black screen after the instructions). After 
a foreperiod varying randomly between 1,000 ms and 2,000 ms in steps of 333 ms, the 
imperative stimulus, the plus sign, was presented in the center of the rectangle. The rectangle and 
the plus sign remained on the screen until the subject pressed the designated response button. In 
case of a mistake (i.e., pressing the response button before the plus sign appeared) the feedback 
tone was presented through the loud speakers. The next trial started after an intertrial interval 
(ITI) of 1,100 ms. H1 was identical to H0, except that two rectangles were presented arranged in 
53 
a row. After the variable foreperiod, the plus sign was presented in one of the two rectangles and 
remained on the screen until the subject pressed the designated response button. In case of a 
mistake (i.e., pressing the response button before the plus sign appeared or pressing the response 
button corresponding to the other empty rectangle) the feedback tone was presented through the 
loud speakers. Presentation of the plus sign was balanced. Thus, the plus sign appeared in each 
of the two rectangles in 50% of the trials. H2 was identical to H1, except that four rectangles 
arranged in two rows were presented. After the variable foreperiod, the plus sign was presented 
in one of the four rectangles and remained on the screen until the subject pressed the designated 
response button. In case of a mistake (i.e., pressing the response button before the plus sign 
appeared or pressing the response button corresponding to one of the other three empty 
rectangles) the feedback tone was presented through the loud speakers. The plus sign was 
presented equiprobably in one of the four rectangles. 
The instructions emphasized responding as quickly as possible, but to avoid response 
errors. The conditions were presented in ascending order. Each condition consisted of 32 trials 
preceded by eight practice trials. The foreperiod and the position of the plus sign were 
pseudorandomized. That is, trial sequence in each condition was identical for all subjects. As 
indicators of individual performance, mean RT based on correct trials were computed separately 
for H0, H1, and H2. Intraindividual outlier correction is reported in chapter 4.1. 
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Figure 6. Stimulus presentation, trial sequence, and Cedrus response pad setup for all three Hick conditions H0 to H2. The temporal course of the 
trial sequence is delineated by the grey drawn-out arrow (t) above the trial sequence of condition H0. In H0, subjects were allowed to press the 
response button with the index finger of their preferred hand. In H1, subjects had to use the right index finger for the lower right response button 
and the left index finger for the lower left response button. In H2, subjects placed their index fingers as in H1 and, in addition, the right middle 
finger had to be used to press the upper right response button and the left middle finger had to be used to press the upper left response button. In all 
conditions, the fingers were placed directly onto the response buttons to avoid movement times. The black arrows indicate the correct answer in the 
respective exemplary trial.   
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+
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3.3.2 Flanker tasks  
Apparatus and stimuli 
Working station A was used for task administration. Stimuli were arrows pointing either 
to the left (<) or to the right (>) with a height of 0.7 cm and width of 0.5 cm on the screen. The 
total length of the five equidistant presented arrows (<<<<<, >>>>>, >><>>>, and <<><<) in 
the third condition (F3) was 3 cm. A feedback tone (1,000 Hz) with a duration of 200 ms was 
used. Stimulus presentation, trial sequence, and response pad setup (with the corresponding 
finger placement) are presented in Figure 7. 
Procedure 
 In the first condition (F1), each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross in the 
center of the screen lasting for 500 ms (except for the first trial, which started after a 1,000 ms 
black screen after the instructions). After a foreperiod varying randomly between 600 ms and 
1,600 ms in steps of 333 ms, the imperative stimulus, an arrow pointing either to the left or to the 
right, was presented in the center of the screen. The arrow remained on the screen until the 
subject pressed the designated response button. In case of a mistake (i.e., pressing the response 
button before the arrow appeared) the feedback tone was presented through the loud speakers. 
Presentation of arrows pointing to the left and right was balanced. The next trial started after an 
ITI of 500 ms. The second condition (F2) was identical to F1, with the difference that subjects 
now had to indicate in what direction the arrow was pointing by pressing the left button if the 
arrow pointed to the left or the right button if the arrow pointed to the right. In case of a mistake 
(i.e., pressing the response button before the arrow appeared or indicating the wrong directional 
response) the feedback tone was presented through the loud speakers. Presentation of arrows 
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pointing to the left and right was balanced. F3 was identical to F2, except that the imperative 
stimulus was now flanked by either congruent (<<<<< or >>>>>) or incongruent (>><>> or 
<<><<) distractor arrows. Subjects had to indicate in what direction the center arrow was 
pointing by pressing the left or right response button. In case of a mistake (i.e., pressing the 
response button before the arrow appeared or indicating the wrong directional response) the 
feedback tone was presented through the loud speakers. The presentation of the imperative 
stimuli with the according congruent or incongruent distractor arrows was balanced. That is, 
each of the four different trial types (<<<<<, >>>>>, >><>>>, and <<><<) was presented in 
25% of all trials. 
The instructions emphasized responding as quickly as possible, but to avoid response 
errors. The conditions were presented in ascending order. F1 and F2 consisted of 32 trials 
preceded by eight practice trials. F3 consisted of 64 trials preceded by 16 practice trials. The 
foreperiod and the presentation of trials were pseudorandomized in each respective condition. 
That is, trial sequence in each condition was identical for all subjects. Before the computation of 
individual performance measures, F3 was split into F4* and F5*. F4* comprised all congruent 
trials and F5* comprised all incongruent trials. As indicators of individual performance, mean 
RT based on correct trials were computed separately for F1, F2, and F5*. Intraindividual outlier 
correction is reported in chapter 4.1. 
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  Figure 7. Stimulus presentation, trial sequence, and Cedrus response pad setup for all three Flanker conditions F1 to F3. The temporal course of the trial 
sequence is delineated by the grey drawn-out arrow (t) above the trial sequence of condition F1. In F1, subjects were allowed to press the response button 
with the index finger of their preferred hand. In F2 and F3, subjects had to use the right index finger for the right response button and the left index finger 
for the left response button. In all conditions, the fingers were placed directly onto the response buttons to avoid movement times. The black arrows 
indicate the correct answer in the respective exemplary trial. The upper two response buttons were inactive and not used for the administration of Flanker. 
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3.3.3 Continuous performance test  
Apparatus and stimuli 
Working station A was used for task administration. Imperative stimuli in the first 
(CPT1) and second condition (CPT2) were X’s (0.9 cm x 0.6 cm). For the third condition 
(CPT3), the same X’s were used, but in cursive typeface. The following distractor letters were 
used for CPT2: K, D, W, R, S, M, G, and A. For CPT3, a non-cursive X was added to the set of 
distractor letters. Stimulus presentation, trial sequence, and response pad setup (with the 
corresponding finger placement) are presented in Figure 8. 
Procedure 
In CPT1, each trial started with the presentation of the imperative stimulus (an X) for 200 
ms in the center of the screen followed by a 1,000 ms black screen response window (during 
these 1,200 ms responses were logged). Subjects had to press the designated response button for 
each X that appeared. After a black screen ITI varying randomly between 0 ms and 1,000 ms in 
steps of 333 ms, the next X was presented. In each condition, the response window and the ITI 
were perceived as one continuous black screen (see Figure 8). In CPT2, each trial started with 
the presentation of a letter (one of the eight distractor letters) for 200 ms in the center of the 
screen followed by a 1,000 ms black screen response window (during these 1,200 ms responses 
were logged). Subjects had to press the designated response button only for each X that 
appeared. After an ITI varying randomly between 0 ms and 1,000 ms in steps of 333 ms, the next 
letter was presented. The presentation of distractor letters was balanced. In CPT3, each trial 
started with the presentation of a letter (one of the nine distractor letters, but not the newly added 
X) for 200 ms in the center of the screen followed by a 1,000 ms black screen response window 
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Figure 8. Stimulus presentation, trial sequence, and Cedrus response pad setup for all three CPT conditions CPT1 to CPT3. The temporal 
course of the trial sequence is delineated by the grey drawn-out arrow (t) above the trial sequence of condition CPT1. The response window 
and the intertrial interval are depicted as one continuous black screen between two presented letters. In all CPT conditions, subjects were 
allowed to press the response button with the index finger of their preferred hand. In all conditions, the finger was placed directly onto the 
response button to avoid movement times. The black arrows indicate the correct answer in the respective exemplary trial. The other three 
response buttons were inactive and not used for the administration of CPT. 
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(during these 1,200 ms responses were logged). Subjects had to press the designated response 
button only for each cursive X that appeared. After an ITI varying randomly between 0 ms and 
1,000 ms in steps of 333 ms, the next letter was presented. The presentation of distractor letters 
was balanced.  
The instructions emphasized responding as quickly as possible, but to avoid response 
errors. As in the Hick paradigm and the Flanker task, the first trial of each condition started after 
a 1,000 ms black screen after the instructions. The conditions were presented in ascending order. 
CPT1 consisted of 32 trials preceded by eight practice trials. CPT2 consisted 120 trials (24 
imperative stimuli and 96 distractor letters) preceded by 10 practice trials (two imperative stimuli 
and eight distractor letters). CPT3 consisted of 240 trials (24 imperative stimuli and 216 
distractor letters) preceded by 20 practice trials (two imperative stimuli and 18 distractor letters). 
The letter sequence and the ITI were pseudorandomized. That is, trial sequence in each condition 
was identical for all subjects. As indicators of individual performance, mean RT based on 
commissions were computed separately for CPT1, CPT2, and CPT3. Intraindividual outlier 
correction is reported in chapter 4.1. 
3.3.4 Duration discrimination with empty intervals 
Apparatus and stimuli 
Working station A was used for task administration. Stimuli were auditory empty 
intervals presented through headphones. Each empty interval was marked by a 3 ms onset and a 
3 ms offset click (i.e., a white noise burst). The duration of the standard interval was 50 ms, 
while the duration of the comparison interval varied according to the weighted up-down method 
(Kaernbach, 1991) as described in the procedure. Visual feedback stimuli were plus signs for 
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correct answers and minus signs for incorrect answers. A pictorial example of a single trial was 
used to instruct the subjects (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
Procedure 
A single trial consisted of one standard interval and one comparison interval separated by 
an interstimulus interval (ISI) of 900 ms. Subjects started the first trial by pressing the lower 
right button of the Cedrus response pad and the auditory presentation began 1,000 ms later. 
Subjects had to indicate whether the first or the second interval was longer by pressing the 
response button labeled “first interval longer” or “second interval longer”. The button “first 
interval longer” corresponded to the lower left button of the Cedrus response pad and had to be 
pressed with the left index finger, while the button “second interval longer” corresponded to the 
lower right button of the Cedrus response pad and had to be pressed with the right index finger. 
After a subject’s response, visual feedback was displayed on screen for 1,500 ms. The next trial 
started 600 ms after the presentation of the feedback.  
DDE consisted of two randomly interleaved series with 32 trials each, resulting in a total 
of 64 trials. In each series, the duration of the comparison interval varied according to the 
weighted up-down method (Kaernbach, 1991) to estimate the 25%- and the 75%-difference-
Figure 9. The pictorial example of a single trial used to instruct the subjects.  
First interval Second interval
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threshold of the individual psychometric function. That is, the 25%-difference-threshold, where 
the shorter interval was incorrectly judged to be the longer interval in 25% of the trials, and the 
75%-difference-threshold, where the longer interval was correctly judged to be the longer 
interval in 75% of the trials. The duration of the first 25%-difference-threshold comparison 
interval was 15 ms shorter than the standard interval (i.e., 35 ms), while the duration of the first 
75%-difference-threshold comparison interval was 15 ms longer than the standard interval (i.e., 
65 ms). For trials 1 to 6 in the 25%-difference-threshold series, the duration of the comparison 
interval was increased by 3 ms when the subject correctly judged the standard interval to be 
longer and decreased by 9 ms when the shorter comparison interval was falsely judged to be 
longer. For trials 7 to 32, the comparison interval was increased by 2 ms if the standard interval 
was correctly judged to be longer and decreased by 6 ms if the shorter comparison interval was 
falsely judged to be longer. The opposite step sizes were employed for the estimation of the 
75%-difference-threshold. Within each series, the order of presentation of the standard and the 
comparison interval was randomized, but with both intervals being presented first equiprobably. 
The instructions emphasized accuracy and pointed out that there is no need to respond as 
quickly as possible. Subjects had to repeat the instructions to the experimenter with the help of 
the pictorial example (see Figure 9). The main block of 64 trials was preceded by five practice 
trials to ensure that subjects did understand the task. As indicator of individual discrimination 
performance, the mean difference between the standard and the comparison interval was 
computed for the last 20 trials of each series. Thus, estimates of the 25%- and 75%-difference-
thresholds in relation to the 50 ms standard interval were obtained. Next, the difference limen 
(DL: Luce & Galanter, 1963) was computed for each subject, which is half of the interquartile 
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range [(75%-difference-threshold value – 25%-difference-threshold value)/2]. A better 
performance is represented by a smaller DL. For the later analyses, all DL’s were inverted, so 
that a higher DL represented a better performance. Interindividual outlier correction is reported 
in chapter 4.1. 
3.3.5 Temporal generalization 
Apparatus and stimuli 
Working station A was used for task administration. Auditory stimuli were white-noise 
bursts presented through headphones. The duration of the standard stimulus was 75 ms, while the 
durations of the non-standard stimuli were 42 ms, 53 ms, 64 ms, 86 ms, 97 ms, and 108 ms. 
Visual feedback stimuli were plus signs for correct answers and minus signs for incorrect 
answers. 
Procedure 
During an initial learning phase, subjects were given five trials to memorize the duration 
of the standard stimulus. After the learning phase, subjects worked through eight experimental 
blocks. In each block, the standard stimulus was presented twice and each non-standard stimulus 
was presented once. The presentation of the eight stimuli was randomized within each block. For 
every presented stimuli, subjects had to decide whether or not the duration matched the duration 
of the previously memorized standard stimulus by pressing either the response button labeled 
“same duration as the standard stimulus” or “not the same duration as the standard stimulus”. 
The button “same duration as the standard stimulus” corresponded to the lower left button of the 
Cedrus response pad and had to be pressed with the left index finger, while the button “not the 
same duration as the standard stimulus” corresponded to the lower right button of the Cedrus 
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response pad and had to be pressed with the right index finger. After a subject’s response, visual 
feedback was displayed on screen for 1,500 ms. The next trial started 700 ms after the 
presentation of the feedback.  
The instructions emphasized accuracy and pointed out that there is no need to respond as 
quickly as possible. Subjects had to repeat the instructions to the experimenter before the 
learning phase. As indicator of individual discrimination performance, an index of response 
dispersion (IRD: McCormack, Brown, Maylor, Darby, & Green, 1999) was computed. For the 
present study, the IRD is the frequency of “same duration as the standard stimulus”-responses to 
the actual standard stimulus divided by the sum of relative frequencies of “same duration as the 
standard stimulus”-responses to all seven stimuli presented. The IRD would be 1.0 if all “same 
duration as the standard stimulus”-responses were given exclusively to the standard stimuli and 
none to the non-standard stimuli. Therefore, a higher IRD indicates a better discrimination 
performance. Interindividual outlier correction is reported in chapter 4.1. 
3.3.6 Temporal order judgment 
Apparatus and stimuli 
Working station B comprised a black viewer box (30 cm × 21 cm × 26.5 cm) with a red 
light-emitting diode (LED) inside and a 17" Samsung SyncMaster 172 N flat screen. Sitting 
distance to the LED (with a diameter of 0.5 cm) was 78 cm. A Smart 100x computer was used to 
administer TOJ (programmed in Turbo Pascal) and a Cherry keyboard (model G81-300) was 
used to record responses. Headphones (Sennheiser model HD 555) were used to present the 
auditory stimuli, while the visual stimuli were presented with the LED. Visual feedback was 
given with the Samsung flat screen, which was placed on the right side of the black viewer box. 
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Auditory stimuli were 1,000 Hz square waves tones presented at an intensity of 70 dB. 
Visual stimuli were generated by the red LED. Visual feedback stimuli were plus signs for 
correct answers and minus signs for incorrect answers. Instructions were given on a separate 
sheet of paper.  
Procedure 
First, the subjects solved five practice trials followed by a single experimental block that 
consisted of two randomly interleaved series with 32 trials each. In one series, the light was 
preceded by the tone and in the other series, the tone was preceded by the light. In each trial of 
both series, subjects had to decide whether the light or the tone was presented first by either 
pressing the response button labeled “light first” or “tone first” (matched to the Enter and Plus 
key of the numeric keypad). Subjects were allowed to use the index finger of their preferred 
hand. In each trial, both stimuli simultaneously terminated 200 ms after the onset of the second 
stimulus. The instructions emphasized accuracy and pointed out that there is no need to respond 
as quickly as possible. 
In both series, the initial stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was set to 70 ms and each 
subsequent SOA varied according to the weighted up-down method (Kaernbach, 1991), which 
converged to the level of 75% of correct responses. While a correct response decreased the SOA 
by 6 ms, each incorrect response increased the SOA by 18 ms. As indicator of individual 
discrimination performance, the mean SOA was computed for the last 20 trials of each series and 
then averaged across series. A better performance in TOJ is represented by a smaller value. For 
the later analyses, the individual performance values were inverted, so that a higher value 
indicated a better performance. Interindividual outlier correction is reported in chapter 4.1. 
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3.4 Time course of study and facility 
 The psychometric assessment of intelligence lasted approximately 70 minutes and was 
always in groups from two to six subjects in a 19 m2 room with six working stations. The 
assessment of psychometric intelligence was separated from the administration of the 
experimental tasks by a minimum of three to a maximum of 13 days. The administration of all 
experimental tasks (including breaks) lasted approximately 90 to 100 minutes. The working 
stations A and B were placed in a 10 m2 sound-attenuated chamber. In both sessions, room 
conditions were held constant for all subjects (i.e., constant lighting and aeration). The data 
collection lasted for 18 months.  
3.5 Statistical analyses 
 All analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2016) and RStudio (RStudio Team, 
2012) was used as editor. In addition to the base functions of R, the following packages were 
used: corrplot (Wei, 2013), dplyr (Wickham & Francois, 2014), lavaan (Rosseel, 2012), psych 
(Revelle, 2015), readxl (Wickham, 2015), reshape2 (Wickham, 2007), rprime (Mahr, 2015), and 
semPlot (Epskamp, 2014). 
 For SEM/CFAs, all models were examined by means of the chi-square (χ2) test statistic 
and approximate fit indices. A non-significant χ2-value is desired since it indicates that the 
implied model does not substantially differ from the empirical data (Kline, 2011). However, in 
complex models and big samples, the χ2-value turns out to be significant even with minor 
differences between the implied model and the data (Barrett, 2007). Therefore, in addition to the 
χ2-test statistic, the following fit indices were used to establish whether a model was acceptable 
or not: Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), the Root Mean Square Error of 
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Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR; Kline, 2011). A CFI ≥ .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999), a RMSEA ≤ .08 (Browne & Cudeck, 
1993), and a SRMR ≤ .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) are considered a good fit. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) was used to compare competing models in relation to parsimony. A 
model with a lower AIC is considered the more parsimonious model (Kline, 2011). 
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4 Results 
4.1 Correction of outliers 
 The outlier correction for Hick, Flanker, and CPT was on an intraindividual basis, 
whereas the outlier correction for the psychophysical timing tasks DDE, TG, and TOJ was on an 
interindividual basis.  
Intraindividual outlier correction for Hick, Flanker, and CPT   
 First, extreme outliers were identified by plotting all trials of all subjects within an ECT 
condition (Figure C.1 in the Appendix C depicts the intraindividual outlier correction described 
here). For all three ECTs, the lower bound was set to 100 ms, which is based on the approximate 
physiological limit of the speed of reaction (Luce, 1986). For Hick and Flanker, the upper bound 
was based on the visual inspection of all plotted trials, whereas for CPT, the upper bound was set 
by the fix duration of the response window (i.e., the 1,200 ms during which responses were 
logged). Second, after the removal of invalid trials exceeding the lower and upper bound, all 
responses exceeding the intraindividual mean RT by three intraindividual standard deviations 
were considered as outliers and removed (cf. Moosbrugger et al., 2006). The thereby removed 
mean number of trials for each ECT condition are reported in Table 2.  
 
 
 
Table 2
H0 H1 H2 F1 F2 F5* CPT1 CPT2 CPT3
Mean trials removed 0.57 0.49 0.96 0.60 1.28 2.19 0.70 0.18 0.18
The mean number of trials removed per subject based on intraindividual outlier correction for the 
Hick, the Flanker, and the CPT conditions
Note . H0 to H1 = Hick conditions; F1 to F5* = Flanker conditions; CPT1 to CPT3 = CPT conditions.
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Interindividual outlier correction for DDE, TG, and TOJ 
 For each psychophysical timing task, interindividual mean and standard deviation were 
computed for the performance measures. All subjects exceeding the mean by three standard 
deviations were considered as outliers and removed. This led to the removal of five subjects in 
total, four in DDE and one in TG (Figure C.2 in the Appendix C depicts the interindividual 
outlier correction for DDE, TG, and TOJ) 
4.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis, and the Shapiro-
Wilk normality test (SWT) for the 18 BIS subtests based on raw scores before z-standardization 
are reported in Table 3. The same descriptive statistics for the Hick, the Flanker, and the CPT 
conditions as well as for the psychophysical timing tasks are reported in Table 4. In addition, the 
Spearman-Brown corrected (Cortina, 1993) split-half reliabilities (based on the odd-even 
method) are provided for the Hick, the Flanker, and the CPT conditions. Descriptive statistics for 
the Hick and the Flanker error rates as well as the CPT omission and false alarm rates are 
reported in Table D.1 in Appendix D. 
 The SWT was computed for all variables, because the use of parametric tests requires 
normally distributed data. For 16 out of 18 BIS subtests (see Table 3) and 10 out of 12 
experimental tasks (see Table 4) the SWT indicated a significant deviation from normality. 
However, as with any other test of significance, a large sample size increases the chance of 
significance, thus, skewness and kurtosis were inspected as well. According to Finney and 
DiStefano (2006), skewness values outside the range of -2.0 to 2.0 and kurtosis values outside 
the range of -7.0 to 7.0 indicate severely non-normal data. Other authors, such as Lienert and 
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Table 3
BIS subtest   M   SD   Min Max  Skewness Kurtosis
SWT
p -value
City map (OG) 15.35  4.36   4 26 - 0.05 - 0.56   .05 
Number sequences (ZN)   4.11  2.58   0   9   0.35 - 1.07 < .001
Figural analogies (AN)   3.36  1.61   0   8   0.09 - 0.54 < .001
X-larger (XG) 19.87  8.07   1 44   0.33   0.28 < .001
Verbal analogies (WA)   3.58  2.02   0   8   0.09 - 0.86 < .001
Paired associates (ZP)   6.05  2.33   0 12   0.16 - 0.13 < .001
Fact-opinion (TM)   9.34  3.54   2 16 - 0.06 - 1.10 < .001
Crossing letters (BD) 53.70  9.22 28 82   0.38   0.28 < .01
Estimation (SC)   3.56  1.96   0   7   0.00 - 0.97 < .001
Story (ST)   8.42  3.51   1 20   0.47 - 0.03 < .001
Charkow (CH)   3.02  1.65   0   6 - 0.13 - 0.79 < .001
Part-whole (TG) 11.51  3.17   1 20 - 0.73   0.66 < .001
Math operators (RZn) 10.13  4.06   1 20   0.22 - 0.24 < .01
Word memory (WMn)   7.03  2.60   1 17   0.59   0.50 < .001
Word classification (KWn) 22.94  6.29   1 36 - 0.50   0.40 < .01
Two-digit numbers (ZZn)   6.86  2.78   0 19   0.67   1.05 < .001
Old English (OEn) 32.28  5.98   4 48 - 0.38   1.59 < .01
Routes memory (WEn) 18.86  5.65   1 31 - 0.18 - 0.03   .11 
Descriptive statistics for the 18 BIS subtests based on raw scores before z-standardization
Note . BIS = Berlin Intelligence Structure; SWT = Shapiro-Wilk normality test; based on N  = 228.
Range
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Table 4
Performance 
measure M      SD Min Max   Skewness  Kurtosis
Shapiro-Wilk 
p -value r tt
Hick
H0 249 29 190 373 0.82 1.11 < .001 .91
H1 305 32 242 447 0.79 1.17 < .001 .92
H2 377 49 262 624 0.98 2.44 < .001 .94
Flanker
F1 263 34 202 432 1.19 2.34 < .001 .96
F2 371 46 300 699 2.06 10.45 < .001 .94
F5* 589 146 360 1642 3.09 15.64 < .001 .97
CPT
CPT1 223 18 179 299 0.47 1.15 < .01 .94
CPT2 378 35 269 481 0.20 0.11  .29 .91
CPT3 483 49 334 677 0.38 0.59 < .05 .92
PPT
DDE 21.43 9.04 6.08 51.50 0.76 0.27 < .001
TG [IRD] .67 .09 .42 .86 - 0.28 - 0.03  .06
TOJ 97.43 30.25 25.45 178.60 0.31 - 0.41 < .05
   in milliseconds
Range
Note.  All M  and SD  values are in milliseconds except for TG which is the IRD; CPT = continuous 
performance test; H0-H2 = Hick conditions; F1-F5* = Flanker conditions; CPT1-CPT3 = CPT conditions; 
PPT = psychophysical timing tasks; DDE = duration discrimination with empty intervals; TG = temporal 
generalization; IRD = index of response dispersion; TOJ = temporal order judgment; SWT = Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test; r tt  = Spearman-Brown corrected (Cortina, 1993) split-half reliability (odd-even-method).
Descriptive statistics for the performance measures of the Hick, the Flanker, and the CPT 
conditions as well as for the three psychophysical timing tasks DDE, TG, and TOJ
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Raatz (1998), proposed a more conservative range for skewness (-0.5 to 0.5). Corresponding to 
the critical values of Finney and DiStefano, only F2 and F5* showed sever non-normality. 
According to Lienert and Raatz, all Hick and Flanker conditions were not normally distributed. 
In order to assure that the present analyses were not biased by deviations from normality, non-
parametric tests were computed in addition to the parametric tests. Furthermore, the Satorra-
Bentler scaling to correct the χ2-values (SBχ2) and the standard errors was used for SEM (Satorra 
& Bentler, 1994). The non-parametric tests are reported alongside to the parametric tests or with 
a reference to the respective Appendix. For correlations, the parametric Pearson’s product-
moment correlation coefficient (in the further course referred to as correlation) was used, since 
this coefficient showed to be robust and to withstand violations of normality (Bishara & Hittner, 
2012). 
 The correlations of the BIS subtests are reported in Table 5. For the most part, the BIS 
subtest correlation matrix showed significant positive correlations with few exceptions. The two 
figural processing speed subtests crossing letters (BD) and old English (OEn), which were 
strongly correlated, r = .53, p < .001, showed rather low as well as several non-significant 
correlations with other BIS subtests. Only four other correlations were found to be non-
significant: figural analogies (AN) and word memory (WMn), r = .13, p = .055, Charkow (CH) 
and WMn, r = .11, p = .101, word classification (KWn) and estimation (SC), r = .09, p = .178, 
SC and WMn, r = .12, p = .075. The BIS subtests scores were aggregated within their respective 
operation facet in order to provide the three manifest indicators for g modeling. Each aggregate 
score represented the mean of the six operation specific subtests (i.e., processing speed mean 
based on BD, OEn, TG, KWn, XG, and RZn; processing capacity mean based on AN, CH, WA, 
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Table 5
AN BD CH KWn OEn OG RZn SC ST TG TM WA WEn WMn XG ZN ZP
BD .13*
CH .52*** .08
KWn .25*** .25*** .17*
OEn .08 .53*** - .05 .31***
OG .26*** .15* .33*** .21** .11
RZn .44*** .26*** .49*** .33*** .18** .31***
SC .32*** .10 .41*** .09 .02 .22*** .50***
ST .28***   .13a .17* .41*** .19** .31*** .29*** .24***
TG .31*** .21** .21** .51*** .22*** .24*** .40*** .16* .39***
TM .29*** .19** .30*** .54*** .17* .20** .33*** .26*** .37*** .45***
WA .51*** .09 .43*** .38*** .04 .26*** .46*** .36*** .34*** .38*** .48***
WEn .21** .11 .35*** .16* .05 .38*** .37*** .23*** .29*** .22*** .17** .19**
WMn   .13a .14* .11 .37*** .20** .25*** .19** .12 .50*** .23*** .30*** .24*** .18**
XG .31*** .24*** .40*** .39*** .11 .22*** .59*** .44*** .35*** .43*** .38*** .37*** .30*** .21**
ZN .45*** .20** .56*** .27*** .09 .30*** .57*** .46*** .26*** .34*** .32*** .44*** .33*** .14* .62***
ZP .22*** .07 .22*** .20** .09 .24*** .34*** .29*** .37*** .20** .15* .17** .33*** .29*** .24*** .31***
ZZn .22**   .13a .24*** .24*** .07 .29*** .31*** .28*** .34*** .24*** .29*** .18** .36*** .25*** .40*** .38*** .36***
Correlations among the 18 BIS subtests
Note. For abbreviations of subtests see Table 3.
aCoefficients were rounded up to .13 and showed p -values > .05.
*p  < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001.
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TM, ZN, and SC; memory mean based on OG, WEn, ST, WMn, ZP, ZZn). The positive strong 
correlations (see Table 6) among the aggregate scores indicated the presence of a positive 
manifold, a necessary requirement for a successful modeling of a g factor. 
 
 The correlations among the experimental performance measures are reported in Table 7. 
Each ECT showed moderate to strong correlations within its respective conditions. The lowest 
correlation was found between F1 and F5*, r = .32, p < .001, whereas the strongest correlation 
was found for H0 and H1, r = .73, p < .001. In addition, the conditions of the different ECTs 
showed moderate to strong correlations among each other, with one exception of a weak 
correlation between F5* and CPT2, r = .26, p < .001. The psychophysical timing tasks showed 
only weak correlations among each other, with the highest correlation found between DDE and 
TG, r = .19, p = .004, whereas the correlation between TG and TOJ was the lowest and just 
reached statistical significance, r = .13, p = .046. Furthermore, the correlations between the 
psychophysical timing tasks and the different ECT conditions were rather weak and most of 
them were non-significant. Most of the significant correlations between the psychophysical 
timing tasks and the ECT conditions were found in relation to the Flanker conditions (see Table 
Table 6
speed capacity
speed
capacity .59***
memory .51*** .52***
Correlations among the three BIS aggregate 
scores processing speed, processing capacity, 
and memory
Note . Speed = processing speed; capacity = processing 
capacity
*** p  < .001.
75 
7). DDE correlated only with CPT1, r = .17, p = .011, whereas TG correlated only with H0, r = 
.19, p = .004, and H1, r = .15, p = .019. 
 The correlations of all performance measures with intelligence are presented in the two 
bottom rows of Table 7. A similar picture is shown in relation to the mean of all z-standardized 
BIS subtests (denoted as z-score in Table 7) and the g factor scores (denoted as g-score in Table 
7). All ECT conditions were weakly correlated with both measures of intelligence, except for 
some CPT conditions. CPT1 did not correlate with the z- and the g-score, whereas CPT2 just 
failed to reach statistical significance in relation to the z-score (p = .051). For the three ECTs, a 
tendency for stronger correlations with intelligence is shown for more complex conditions. The 
psychophysical timing tasks correlated weakly with both intelligence measures. The z- and the g-
scores showed a perfect correlation (r = .99, p < .001). 
4.3 Research question 1: Temporal resolution power and intelligence 
 The latent variables TRP and g are based on three indicator variables each, thus, represent 
perfect identified measurement models which cannot be analyzed meaningfully by means of a χ2-
test or fit indices (Kline, 2011). However, based on the positive manifold depicted in the BIS 
correlation matrices (see Table 5 or Table 6) and the positive, albeit low, correlations among the 
psychophysical timing tasks (see Table 7), it was expected that the necessary prerequisite of a 
positive manifold was met for both constructs. In addition, to validate the g model used in the 
present study, its g factor scores were correlated with g factor scores of different g models (as 
e.g. suggested by Beaujean, 2015). The g factors of the different models were virtually identical 
(see Appendix E for details).
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Table 7
H0 H1 H2 F1 F2 F5* CPT1 CPT2 CPT3 DDE TG TOJ z -score
H1 .73***
H2 .60*** .70***
F1 .60*** .47*** .40***
F2 .52*** .59*** .55*** .50***
F5* .35*** .39*** .49*** .32*** .63***
CPT1 .55*** .48*** .52*** .41*** .46*** .33***
CPT2 .44*** .41*** .42*** .34*** .50*** .26*** .49***
CPT3 .43*** .47*** .41*** .31*** .43*** .31*** .35*** .68***
DDE .11 .03       .10 .14*   .16* .07    .17*   .03       .04       
TG .19** .15*   .09       .09       .21*    .12       .10       .09       .10       .19**      
TOJ .11         .13a .12 .12 .15*   .16*   .12       .09       .12       .18**   .13*    
z -score -.18** -.18**     -.24*** -.19** -.24*** -.28*** -.05       -.13a -.20**   -.23*** -.19** -.23***   
g -score -.20** -.19** -.26*** -.21** -.25*** -.30*** -.07       -.14*     -.20**   -.23*** -.20** -.23***   .99***
Note. CPT = continuous performance test; H0-H2 = Hick conditions; F1-F5* = Flanker conditions; CPT1-CPT3 = CPT conditions; DDE = duration discrimination with empty intervals; TG = temporal 
generalization; TOJ = temporal order judgment; z -score = the mean of all z -standardized BIS subtests; g -score = g  factor scores derived from the g  measurement model used in the present study.
aCoefficients were rounded up to .13 and showed p -values > .05.
*p  < .05. **p  < .01. ***p  < .001.
Correlations among the conditions of the three elementary cognitive tasks, the three psychophysical timing tasks, a manifest intelligence score (z-score), and the g 
factor score
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 The relationship between TRP and g was modeled as predictive path from TRP to g as 
depicted in Figure 10. A good model fit was observed, SBχ2(8) = 3.034, p = .932, CFI = 1.000, 
RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .015, with a significant path coefficient, β = .60, p = .002, indicating 
substantial predictive strength of TRP explaining 36.48% of variance in g. All standardized 
factor loadings and error scores presented in Figure 9 were significant (at least p < .01). 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Research question 2: Interplay between temporal resolution power, attention, and 
intelligence 
 The present chapter is divided in three subchapters. First, the manipulation check of 
complexity is presented. Second, the two steps of isolating perceptual attention from the non-
experimental processes are presented followed by the third subchapter presenting the mediation 
analysis.  
Figure 10. The structural model of the relationship between TRP and g. TRP is based on the 
three psychophysical timing task used, whereas g is based on the BIS aggregate scores of 
processing speed (Speed), processing capacity (Capacity), and memory (Memory). All 
depicted factor loadings and errors were significant with at least p < .01. The marker loadings 
were DDE for TRP and Speed for g (as indicated by the superscript 1). 
**p < .01. 
TRP g
TOJ
TG
DDE
.60**
Memory
Capacity
Speed.78
.86
.84
.43
.40
.55
.451
.37
.41
.761
.67
.78
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4.4.1 Manipulation check: complexity 
 The descriptive statistics showed that the mean RTs increased across conditions in each 
ECT (see Table 4). Therefore, one-way repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were 
used to test whether RTs were influenced by the experimental manipulation of complexity. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated for Hick, χ2(2) = 82.44, p < .001, for Flanker, χ2(2) = 
336.58, p < .001, and for CPT, χ2(2) = 62.27, p < .001, thus, the degrees of freedom (df) of the F-
Tests were adjusted according to the Greenhouse-Geisser-method (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959). 
The ANOVAs revealed that the mean RTs differed significantly between the Hick conditions, 
F(1.54, 349.58) = 1692.26, p < .001, the Flanker conditions, F(1.12, 254.24) = 1039.62, p < 
.001, and the CPT conditions, F(1.62, 367.74) = 5326.63, p < .001. Furthermore, the Tukey post-
hoc tests determined that all conditions differed significantly from each other in each ECT (all 
pairwise comparisons at p < .001). In addition, the non-parametric Friedman rank sum tests and 
its according post-hoc tests also showed that the experimental manipulation of complexity 
worked for each ECT (see Appendix F). 
4.4.2 Isolating attention with fixed-links modeling  
 In order to examine the interplay between TRP, perceptual attention, and g, fixed-links 
measurement models had to be identified for each ECT. Therefore, variance caused by the 
experimental manipulation of complexity was disentangled from variance independent of the 
experimental manipulation of complexity (i.e., the non-experimental processes constant across 
ECT conditions) by means of FLM. For the non-experimental variable, the unstandardized factor 
loadings were all fixed to 1. For the experimental variable, the unstandardized factor loadings 
had to be identified first, since there is no standard approach in fixing factor loadings of an 
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experimental variable in FLM. For this purpose, different increasing trajectories were modeled 
based on the rationale that complexity was increased across ECT conditions. In all fixed-links 
measurement models, the experimental and the non-experimental variable were forced to be 
independent by fixing their correlation to zero. For the further course of this dissertation, the 
experimental and the non-experimental variable for the fixed-links measurement models are 
abbreviated with the respective ECT’s first letter and a lower case letter indicating the respective 
fixed-links variable. As an example, the experimental variable of the Hick paradigm is 
abbreviated as HEXP and the non-experimental variable as HNEXP. The process of identifying 
appropriate factor loadings for each ECT is described in the following three paragraphs. Table 8 
shows the tested factor fixations and the fit statistics of all models referred to in the rest of this 
chapter.  
Hick: Fixed-links measurement models 
 Four theory-driven trajectories were modeled for HEXP: an increasing trajectory according 
to the bits of information contained in each condition (model 1), a linear increase (model 2), a 
monotonic increase based on the number of possible stimulus locations (model 3), and a 
quadratic increase (model 4). Out of these four models, model 3 was selected since it fitted the 
data best, SBχ2(1) = 0.096, p = .756, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .008. The variance 
of HEXP, z = 7.41, p < .001, and HNEXP, z = 3.51, p < .001, were both significant. In addition, 
model 3 was the most parsimonious model (AIC = 226.182) compared to the models 1, 2, and 4 
(see Table 8). Model 3 is depicted in Figure 11 with the Flanker and the CPT fixed-links 
measurement models.  
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Flanker: Fixed-links measurement models 
 The identical fixations of factor loadings were used as for Hick, but with the difference 
that the trajectory was based on four conditions (F1, F2, F4*, and F5*), but only three conditions 
(F1, F2, and F5*) were used as indicators. As an example, a linear trajectory based on four 
conditions would result in the according fixation of factor loadings: 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, 
condition F4* was omitted and, hence, the following fixation of factor loadings resulted for a 
linear trajectory: 1, 2, and 4. Evaluating the models presented in Table 8, only model 8 
represented the data well, SBχ2(1) = 0.333, p = .564, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = 
ECT Model
Fixed factor 
loadings SBχ2 df    p  CFI
   
RMSEA    SRMR AIC
1 0,1,2 3.677 1    .055 .989 .108 .057 232.206
2 1,2,3 0.682 1    .409 1.000 .000 .021 227.029
3 1,2,4 0.096 1    .756 1.000 .000 .008 226.182
4 1,4,9 1.745 1    .186 .997 .057 .036 228.718
5 0,1,3 5.631 1    .018 .876   .143 .075 1120.570
6 1,2,4 0.609 1    .435 1.000 .000 .027 1112.797
7 1,2,6 1.277 1    .259 1.000 .035 .046 1115.379
8 1,4,16 0.333 1    .564 1.000 .000 .014 1111.842
9 0,1,2 0.004 1    .950 1.000 .000 .001 176.080
10 1,2,3 19.761 1 < .001 .894 .287 .095 196.659
11 1,2,4 28.603 1 < .001 .844 .348 .121 207.346
12 1,4,9 9.275 1    .002 .953 .191 .060 185.346
Note. The column "fixed factor loadings" indicates the factor loadings of the respective experimental latent 
variable. ECT = elementary cogntive task; SBχ2 = Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; CPT = Continuous Performance Test.
CPT
Table 8
Hick
Flanker
Fixation of factor loadings and fit statistics for the fixed-links measurement models of Hick, 
Flanker, and CPT
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.014. Both, the variance of FEXP, z = 4.75, p < .001, and FNEXP, z = 2.13, p = .034, were 
significant. Model 5 did not represent the data well, SBχ2(1) = 5.631, p = .018, CFI = .876, 
RMSEA = .143, SRMR = .075. Model 6 showed a negative and non-significant estimated 
variance of FNEXP, z = -.70, p = .483. In addition, model 8 was the most parsimonious model 
(AIC = 1111.842) compared to the models, 5, 6, and 7 (see Table 8). Model 8 is depicted in 
Figure 11 with the Hick and the CPT fixed-links measurement models. 
CPT: Fixed-links measurement models 
 The identical fixations of factor loadings were used as for Hick. Model 9 represented the 
data best, SBχ2(1) = 0.004, p = .950, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = .000, SRMR = .001 and was the 
most parsimonious model (AIC = 176.080) compared to the models 10, 11, and 12. In addition, 
the variances of CEXP, z = 6.62, p < .001, and CNEXP, z = 6.39, p < .001, were both significant. 
Model 10 showed a negative and non-significant estimated variance of CNEXP, z = -1.08, p = .282. 
Model 11 did not fit the data well, SBχ2(1) = 28.603, p < .001, CFI = .844, RMSEA = .348, 
SRMR = .121. Furthermore, model 12 did not fit the data well, SBχ2(1) = 9.275, p = .002, CFI = 
.953, RMSEA = .191, SRMR = .060. Model 9 is depicted in Figure 11 with the Hick and the 
Flanker fixed-links measurement models. 
Modeling the higher-order latent variable of perceptual attention and the higher-order latent 
variable of the non-experimental processes 
 Based on the fixed-links measurement models identified for Hick, Flanker, and CPT, a 
higher-order experimental latent variable (EXP) representing perceptual attention and a higher-
order non-experimental latent variable (NEXP) representing the non-experimental processes 
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Figure 11. An illustration of the Hick, Flanker, and CPT fixed-links measurement models selected for the further analyses of the present 
study. The superscript numbers above the standardized factor loadings indicate the unstandardized factor loadings used for fixation. For each 
ECT, an experimental latent variable (e.g., HEXP for Hick) was dissociated from a non-experimental latent variable (e.g., HNEXP for Hick). The 
latent variables were forced to be independent. All errors were significant at least with p < .05, except for CPT1 (p = .643). 
HNEXP HEXP
H2H1H0
0
.811 .711 .291 .522 .694
.26
.481
.22 .29
FNEXP FEXP
F5*F2F1
0
.691 .511 .221 .654 .8316
.48
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.31 .29
CNEXP CEXP
CPT3CPT2CPT1
0
.971 .511 .000 .591 .842
.06
.361
.39 .16
Hick Flanker CPT
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were modeled (see Figure 12). The EXP was based on HEXP, FEXP, and CEXP, whereas the NEXP 
was based on HNEXP, FNEXP, and CNEXP.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. An illustration of the higher-order structural model based on the three fixed-links 
measurement models derived for Hick, Flanker, and CPT. Considering the fixed-links 
measurement model, the superscript numbers above the standardized factor loadings indicate the 
unstandardized factor loadings used for fixation. For the higher-order experimental (EXP) and 
non-experimental latent variable (NEXP) the marker loadings were HNEXP for NEXP and HEXP 
for EXP (as indicated by the superscript 1). All errors were significant at least with p < .01. 
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
NEXP EXP
HNEXP HEXP FNEXP FEXP CNEXP CEXP
H2H1H0 F5*F2F1 CPT3CPT2CPT1
.901
.42**
.25.27 .33 .53 .29 .37 .31 .40 .19
.94*** .50**
.751.641 .441 .241 .422 .574 .831 .441 .311 .000 .571 .802.7416.594.191.141.461.611
.831.85*** .75**
Hick Flanker CPT
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 The higher-order model showed a satisfactory fit, SBχ2(23) = 50.972, p < .001, CFI = 
.953, RMSEA = .073, SRMR = .039. The freely estimated factor loadings of EXP and NEXP 
were all significant (at least with p < .01) and the variance of EXP, z = 2.64, p = .008, as well as 
of NEXP, z = 3.83, p < .001, was significant. The EXP and NEXP significantly correlated, r = 
.42, p = .006. If the correlation between EXP and NEXP was fixed to 0, a worse model fit 
resulted, SBχ2(24) = 60.093, p < .001, CFI = .939, RMSEA = .081, SRMR = .086. A SBχ2-
difference test (Satorra & Bentler, 2001) showed that the model with the correlation fixed to 0 
was significantly worse than the model with the freely estimated correlation, SBχ2(1) = 11.135, p 
< .001. 
4.4.3 Mediation analysis 
 First, the principle of mediation and the appropriate mediation method to be used are 
introduced. Second, the correlations among the four constructs are reported followed by the two 
predictor models used to evaluate the predictive power of TRP in EXP and NEXP as well as the 
predictive power of EXP and NEXP in g. Third, the mediation model is presented. 
The principle of mediation 
 A simple mediation model evaluates how a predictor variable x exerts its effect on a 
criterion y, but with an intervening variable z located casually between x and y. Baron and Kenny 
(1986) introduced the causal steps approach, which helps to illustrate and explain the principle 
of mediation. The causal steps approach is supposed to help researchers decide whether a 
variable z functions as a mediator for the two variables x and y by casually interpreting a set of 
four regression hypotheses about these three variables. In a first step, it is investigated whether 
there is evidence for a statistical significant regression of the predictor x on criterion y (denoted 
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as total effect βc in Figure 13). In a second step, it is investigated whether predictor x predicts the 
potential mediating variable z (βa path in Figure 13), followed by the third step, in which it is 
investigated whether the potential mediating variable z predicts the criterion y (βb path in Figure 
12) controlled for the predictor x. In the fourth step, it is investigated how the mediator z 
influences the prediction of the criterion y through the predictor x (βc’ in Figure 13). If all four 
steps are fulfilled and βc´ is close to zero, then z is deemed as a mediator. If βc´ is not zero, but 
significantly weakened compared to βc, then it is spoken of a partial mediation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. An illustration of the causal steps approach introduced by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
The lower part of Figure 13 depicts each step separately, whereas the upper part of Figure 13 
depicts the integrated mediation model. For the present study, the causal steps approach is only 
used to illustrate the principle of mediation.  
x y
z
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x yβc x
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z
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 Despite being used in virtually all fields of social sciences, the casual steps approach was 
heavily criticized (Hayes, 2009; Hayes, Preacher, & Myers, 2011; LeBreton, Wu, & Bing, 2009). 
For example, Hayes (2009) remarked that the casual steps approach is not statistically testing an 
indirect effect βab (product term of the two paths βa and βb as presented in Figure 13) per se, the 
one thing it is supposed to “test”, but rather infers its existence from the set of four hypotheses. 
Further major points of criticism came from simulation studies, which showed that the casual 
steps approach had low statistical power compared to other tests of mediation (Fritz & 
MacKinnon, 2007; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). For detailed 
overview on the criticism and the statistical shortcomings of the casual steps approach see 
LeBreton and colleagues (2009). 
 Inferences about βab need to be drawn based on an empirically derived bootstrap 
sampling distribution of βab (Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). That is, the original sample 
is resampled with replacement in order to generate a new sample of the exact same sample size 
as the original sample. This process is repeated k-times with at least k = 1000 (MacKinnon, 
2008), but it is recommended to obtain up to k = 5000 (Hayes, 2009) bootstrap samples. For each 
of these k bootstrap samples, βab is estimated. To test whether βab is statistically different from 
zero, the bootstrapped sampling distribution has to be rearranged so that the k estimates of βab are 
sorted from the lowest to the highest estimate. Based on this rearranged distribution, the 95% 
confidence interval is computed by identifying the values that correspond to the 2.5% and 97.5% 
percentiles. Based on this 95% percentile confidence interval (pCI), the null hypothesis (i.e., βab 
= 0) can be rejected with 95% confidence, if the zero does not fall between the lower and upper 
bound of the pCI. There are several variations of bootstrapped CI (see Davison & Hinkley, 
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2005). However, recent simulation studies showed that the pCI method outperforms other types 
of bootstrapped CI considering type I error rates, statistical power, and coverage rates (Biesanz, 
Falk, & Savalei, 2010; Falk, 2016; Falk & Biesanz, 2015; B. O. Muthén et al., 2016). 
Correlations among temporal resolution power, perceptual attention, intelligence, and the non-
experimental processes  
 First, all four latent variables (TRP, EXP, g, and NEXP) were combined as correlation 
model (see Figure 14), which showed a satisfactory fit, SBχ2(81) = 132.190, p < .001, CFI = 
.951, RMSEA = .053, SRMR = .051. The highest correlation was found between TRP and g, r = 
.60, p < .001. TRP also correlated significantly with the EXP, r = -.31, p = .026, and the NEXP, r 
= -.41, p = .003. Additionally, EXP and NEXP were significantly correlated, r = .42, p = .003. In 
relation to g, both, the EXP, r = -.50, p < .001, as well as the NEXP, r = -.16, p = .043, were 
significantly correlated.  
Predictive models of temporal resolution power, perceptual attention, intelligence, and the non-
experimental processes  
Figure 14. Correlations among the four latent variables 
TRP, g, EXP, and NEXP. Indicator variables and lower 
levels of the higher-order EXP/NEXP-model were 
omitted.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
 
NEXP
EXP
TRP g
.60***
.42**
-.31* -.50***
-.41** -.16*
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 The predictive power of TRP in relation to EXP and NEXP (left model in Figure 15 
denoted as TRP-predictor model) as well as the predictive power of EXP and NEXP in relation 
to g (right model in Figure 15 denoted as mediator-predictor model) were evaluated. The TRP-
predictor model showed a satisfactory fit, SBχ2(48) = 74.622, p = .008, CFI = .964, RMSEA = 
.049, SRMR = .038. TRP was a significant predictor of EXP, βa1 = -.31, p = .039, and NEXP, βa2 
= -.41, p = .017. The residual correlation between EXP and NEXP was not significant, r = .34, p 
= .078. The mediator-predictor model showed a satisfactory fit, SBχ2(48) = 104.243, p < .001, 
CFI = .939, RMSEA = .072, SRMR = .056. EXP and NEXP were significantly correlated, r = 
.42, p = .003, but only EXP was a significant predictor of g, βb1 = -.52, p = .001, while NEXP did 
not significantly predict g, βb2 = .05, p = .728. In addition, Figure 15 also reports the correlations 
(in brackets below the β-values) for both models when specified as correlation models instead of 
predictive models. 
Bootstrap mediation analysis 
 The two mediators EXP and NEXP were modeled as parallel mediators in the 
relationship between TRP and g (see Figure 16). The model showed a satisfactory fit, SBχ2(81) = 
132.190, p < .001, CFI = .951, RMSEA = .053, SRMR = .051. TRP significantly predicted g, βc´ 
= .57, p = .005, as well as EXP, βa1 = -.31, p = .034, and NEXP, βa2 = -.41, p = .009. Only EXP 
significantly predicted g, βb1 = -.43, p = .010, while NEXP did not significantly predict g, βb2 = 
.26, p = .079. In addition, the residual correlation between EXP and NEXP was not significant, r 
= .34, p = .053. 
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 The standardized indirect effect ab1, βab1 = .13, is the product term of the TRP-EXP 
prediction, βa1 = -.31, and the EXP-g prediction, βb1 = -.43. The standardized indirect effect ab2, 
βab2 = -.11, is the product term of the TRP-NEXP prediction, βa2 = -.41, and the NEXP-g 
prediction, βb2 = .26. In order to test the significance of βab1 and βab2, k = 5000 bootstrap samples 
were generated of which 99.5% (i.e., 4975 samples) converged successfully. For both indirect 
effects, the 95% pCIs were computed. The pCI [-.06, .57] of βab1 did include the zero, thus, it can 
be concluded that βab1 was not significantly different from zero at p < .05 (two-tailed). For βab2, 
the pCI [-.95, .01] indicated that βab2 was not significant either. The bootstrapped distributions of 
the 4975 estimated indirect effects ab1 and ab2 are displayed in Figure G.1 in Appendix G.  
Figure 15. The predictive power of TRP in relation to EXP and NEXP (TRP-predictor model) 
and the predictive power of EXP and NEXP in relation to g (mediator-predictor model). 
Correlations are reported in brackets below the β-values.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure 16. The parallel multiple mediator model with EXP and NEXP 
specified as mediators of the TRP-g-relationship.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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5 Discussion 
 The TRP hypothesis refers to the idea that temporal acuity of the central nervous system 
accounts for speed and efficiency of information processing and, thus, underlies individual 
differences in intelligence (e.g., Helmbold et al., 2007). The functional relationship between TRP 
and intelligence has been reported repeatedly (Haldemann et al., 2012; Helmbold & Rammsayer, 
2006; Helmbold et al., 2007; Rammsayer & Brandler, 2007). Because attention is involved in 
both, temporal as well as non-temporal information processing (Brown, 2008b; Carroll, 1993; 
Schweizer et al., 2005), the relationship between TRP and intelligence could alternatively be 
explained by attention as common source of variance. However, the influence of attention on the 
relationship between TRP and intelligence has never been systematically examined. Therefore, 
the present study aimed to arrive at a better understanding of the role of attention in the context 
of the TRP hypothesis. In the following, the two research questions RQ1 and RQ2 are answered 
and discussed, followed by study limitations and future directions of research. 
5.1 Temporal resolution power and intelligence 
 In RQ1 it was examined whether the relationship between TRP and g can be replicated. 
As a necessary prerequisite, it had to be evaluated whether the identification of the measurement 
models of TRP and g was acceptable.  
5.1.1 Measurement models of temporal resolution power and intelligence 
 The latent variables TRP and g were both modeled based on three indicators. For TRP, 
the three psychophysical timing tasks DDE, TG, and TOJ were used, whereas g was modeled 
based on the three aggregate scores of processing speed, processing capacity, and memory, as 
measured with a modified short version of the BIS test (cf. Wicky, 2014). The goodness of fit of 
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the two measurement models had to be determined based on alternative criteria than the typically 
used χ2-test statistic and fit indices, because measurement models based on three indicators are 
perfectly identified models, which are not testing any hypothesis and yield a trivial fit (Kline, 
2011). The following criteria were used instead. First, TRP and g were modeled based on 
indicators that were already successfully used in previous TRP studies (Stauffer et al., 2014; 
Troche & Rammsayer, 2009b). In addition, DDE, TG, and TOJ were previously proven to be 
valid indicators of TRP (Rammsayer & Brandler, 2004) and the three g indicators covered the 
most frequently suggested components of intelligence (e.g., Carroll, 1993). Second, the 
correlation matrix of the three indicators of each construct had to depict a positive manifold in 
order to be reduced to a single latent variable. The psychophysical timing task showed low, 
nonetheless significant positive correlations among each other (see Table 7), whereas the BIS 
aggregate scores showed strong positive correlations among each other (see Table 6). 
Consequently, the criterion of a positive manifold was fulfilled for both constructs. Third, the 
present g model was compared to more complex g models to ensure that the chosen basic model 
did indeed measure g. This was especially important since the current literature presents different 
suggestions of g modeling (cf. Beaujean, 2015). For this purpose, the g factor scores of the 
present model were correlated with g factor scores of more complex higher-order or bi-factorial 
models of g (Appendix G). The high correlations among the g factor scores indicated that the 
present g factor was virtually identical to the g factors derived from more complex models. 
Furthermore, in line with Jensen and Weng (1994), g showed to be remarkably robust and rather 
invariant across different approaches of modeling. Consequently, despite not being able to 
evaluate the goodness of fit of the identified TRP and g measurement models by means of the χ2-
93 
test statistic or the fit indices, the alternative criteria presented provided evidence for a valid 
measurement of both constructs. Additional evidence for a valid modeling of TRP and g comes 
from the χ2-test statistic and the fit indices of the combined model presented next. 
5.1.2 The relationship between temporal resolution power and intelligence  
 Within the framework of the model that specified TRP as predictor of g (see Figure 10), a 
strong relationship between TRP and g was confirmed. As a matter of fact, the relationship (β = 
.60) was among the strongest found throughout the entire TRP literature. So far, the strongest 
relationship (β = .67) was found in Helmbold, Troche, and Rammsayer (2007). In the present 
study, TRP accounted for 36.48% of overall variability in g. This is in line with previous studies, 
in which TRP accounted for a substantial portion of overall variability in intelligence 
(Haldemann et al., 2011, 2012; Helmbold & Rammsayer, 2006; Helmbold et al., 2006, 2007; 
Rammsayer & Brandler, 2007). As initially proposed by Rammsayer and Brandler (2002, 2007), 
the present finding confirms that TRP is a reliable and substantial determinant of individual 
differences in general intelligence. 
5.2 The interplay between temporal resolution power, attention, and intelligence 
 In RQ2 it was examined whether the relationship between TRP and g is of genuine nature 
or if perceptual attention represents a common source of variance and, hence, accounts for the 
formation of the as hitherto considered genuine relationship. In order to find an answer to RQ2, 
four necessary prerequisites had to be fulfilled. First, the relationship between TRP and g had to 
be replicated as confirmed in RQ1. Second, the experimental manipulation of complexity had to 
be successful. That is, the increase of complexity across ECT conditions should lead to increased 
attentional demands put on the limited processing resources, which, in turn, should lead to 
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prolonged RTs across ECT conditions. That way, the experimental manipulation of complexity is 
directly linked to Kahneman’s (1973) theory of limited processing resources. Third, for each 
ECT, the experimentally caused variance had to be successfully dissociated from the non-
experimental variance by means of FLM in order to obtain a pure measure of the respective type 
of attention. Fourth, a higher-order latent variable of perceptual attention (as represented by the 
EXP) had to be modeled based on the three experimental latent variables (i.e., HEXP, FEXP, and 
CEXP) derived in each ECT. In cases where the non-experimental latent variables (i.e., HNEXP, 
FNEXP, and CNEXP) were significant, the same higher-order modeling approach was used to derive 
a NEXP. 
5.2.1 Manipulation of complexity 
 The present study aimed to increase task complexity according to Jensen’s (2011) means 
of information load. That is, the experimental manipulation of complexity aimed to increase the 
cognitive demands based on the rationale that more complex task conditions require higher 
cognitive demands in information processing (Stankov & Schweizer, 2007). Hence, more 
complex tasks require more of the limited processing resources, which in turn, lead to prolonged 
RTs. In that context, the term complexity is often used synonymously with task difficulty, but 
these two terms should be distinguished carefully (Spilsbury et al., 1990). The difficulty of a task 
can be increased without increasing its complexity. As an example, a task can be made more 
difficult by presenting the stimuli in smaller print, while the amount of information to be 
processed remains the same (Jensen, 2006; Spilsbury et al., 1990). In the present study, the 
manipulation of complexity in the respective ECT aimed to trigger specific attentional processes. 
For the Hick paradigm, the number of elements (i.e., possible stimulus locations) a subject had to 
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attend to was systemically increased across conditions in order to increase the demands on the 
selective aspect of selective-focused attention. 
 For the Flanker task, selective-focused attention was manipulated across conditions with 
an emphasis on the aspect of focusing, since only one possible stimulus location was presented 
and subjects had to ignore the irrelevant information. In F1, subjects had to ignore the directional 
response of the imperative stimuli, whereas in F2, subjects had to focus on the specific 
directional response indicated by the respective imperative stimulus. In F3, complexity was 
additionally increased by adding flankers aside of the imperative stimuli, which either indicated a 
congruent or an incongruent directional response. For the incongruent trials (<<><< or >><>>), 
the subject had to inhibit the automatically activated false directional response induced by the 
incongruent flankers. Consequently, the demands of focusing on the relevant were systematically 
increased across ECT conditions. F5* showed the longest mean RT (see Table 4) and the highest 
error rate (see Appendix D) of all ECT conditions suggesting that F5* was the most complex 
condition of all ECT conditions.  
 For the CPT, CPT1 consisted of targets only, whereas CPT2 and CPT3 consisted of 
targets and distractor stimuli. Hence, for CPT1, complexity was kept at a minimum level so that 
a subject’s limited processing capacity was challenged only marginally. This low degree of 
complexity suggests that only a minimum number of cognitive processes are involved in 
obtaining a correct response. As a matter of fact, CPT1 showed the shortest mean RT of all ECT 
conditions (see Table 4) suggesting that CPT1 was a rather simple RT condition (cf. Schweizer, 
1996). In contrast to CPT1, the two other CPT conditions were more complex. In these two 
conditions, a subject had to sustain its attention in order to search for and respond to an 
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imperative stimulus in a rapid sequence of multiple distractor stimuli. In comparison to CPT2, 
CPT3 was even more complex by increasing information processing demands by means of 
inhibitory control. That is, the previously used imperative stimulus of CPT2 was used as 
additional distractor stimulus in the set of distractor stimuli in CPT3. Therefore, the previously 
habituated response had to be inhibited during CPT3, which put additional attentional demands 
on the human information processor.  
 For each ECT, the repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
complexity, meaning that the RTs increased substantially across ECT conditions. Furthermore, 
the post-hoc tests revealed that the RTs of the three conditions differed significantly from each 
other in all ECT used. The same effect was found when non-parametric tests were used. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the manipulation of complexity did work and that demands 
on the limited information processing resources were systematically increased across the 
respective ECT conditions. Further evidence for a successful manipulation of complexity comes 
from the finding that more complex ECT conditions showed a tendency to correlate higher with 
intelligence than less complex ECT conditions. This is in line with the complexity hypothesis 
(e.g., Vernon & Jensen, 1984) and the assumption that attention is the main driver of the 
correlation between latency-based performance measures and intelligence (Heitz et al., 2005; 
Schweizer, 2010). The more attention an ECT condition requires, the higher its correlation with 
intelligence. However, the attention-paced speed variance has to be dissociated from the residual 
speed variance in order to obtain a pure measure of latency-based perceptual attention. 
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5.2.2 Isolating attention from the non-experimental processes 
 The process of isolating the experimentally induced variance from the non-experimental 
variance was conducted by means of FLM. For each ECT, the factor loadings of the 
experimental variable were fixed according to the theoretically expected trajectory caused by the 
respective experimental manipulation of complexity. However, no standard approach for the 
fixation of factor loadings exists. Therefore, different increasing trajectories representing the 
complexity increase were modeled. For the non-experimental variables, the factor loadings were 
always fixed to 1. These different fixed-links measurement models derived were analyzed by 
means of χ2-test statistic and fit indices.  
Hick: Fixed-links measurement models 
 Model 3 with the factor loadings of the HEXP fixed to 1, 2, and 4 represented the data best. 
This trajectory represented the increased information processing demands of selective-focused 
attention caused by the number of possible stimulus location presented in each condition. That 
way, the HEXP and the HNEXP were successfully dissociated. The variance of both latent variables 
was significant and, hence, statistically meaningful. The HEXP represented the increased demands 
associated with the selective aspect of selective-focused attention, whereas the HNEXP represented 
all other residual processes not associated with selective-focused attention. The discarded fixed-
links measurement models either showed worse fit indices or were less parsimonious. 
Flanker: Fixed-links measurement models 
 The third condition was split into two conditions, one representing the congruent (F4*) 
and the other representing the incongruent trials (F5*). Only F5* was modeled in combination 
with F1 and F2, because only the incongruent trials represented the effect of inhibitory control, 
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whereas the congruent trials were only used to intensify the complexity manipulation in F3. That 
is, a subject did not know in advance if a congruent or incongruent trial was presented and, 
hence, had to flexibly switch between the execution and the inhibition of the automatically 
triggered directional responses induced by the flankers. Model 8 with the factor loadings of the 
FEXP fixed to a quadratic increase of 1, 4, and 16 fitted the data best. This trajectory represented 
the increased information processing demands of selective-focused attention caused by the 
increased need to focus on the relevant. That way, the FEXP and the FNEXP were successfully 
dissociated. The variance of both latent variables was significant and, hence, statistically 
meaningful. The FEXP represented the increased demands associated with the focusing aspect and 
the perceptual process associated with the inhibitory aspect of selective-focused attention. The 
FNEXP represented all other residual processes not associated with selective-focused attention. 
The discarded fixed-links measurement models either showed a significant χ2-test statistic, worse 
fit indices, were less parsimonious, or showed further deficiencies such as negative variances. 
CPT: Fixed-links measurement models 
 The three CPT conditions differed not only in complexity, but also in the function of the 
conditions. All Hick and Flanker conditions showed qualitative similarities, whereas CPT1 
showed qualitative differences to CPT2 and CPT3. That is, CPT1 was a rather simple RT 
condition with a very low level of complexity, whereas CPT2 and CPT3 were classical measures 
of sustained attention putting increased attentional demands on the human information processor. 
Therefore, model 9 with the factor loadings of the CEXP fixed to 0, 1, and 2 was chosen in order 
to represent the qualitative difference between CPT1 and the other two CPT conditions. That 
way, the CEXP and the CNEXP were successfully dissociated and this model represented the data 
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best. The variance of both latent variables was significant and, hence, statistically meaningful. 
The CEXP represented the increased demands associated with sustained attention, whereas the 
CNEXP represented all other residual processes, most likely simple speed processes. The other 
CPT measurement models examined, which did not indicate a functional difference between 
CPT1 and the other two conditions, had to be discarded due to a significant χ2-test statistic, bad 
fit indices, or further deficiencies such as negative variances. 
5.2.3 Higher-order modeling of attention and non-experimental processes 
 HEXP, FEXP, and CEXP as well as HNEXP, FNEXP, and CNEXP were all significant and, 
consequently, statistically meaningful. Therefore, the non-experimental variables were included 
in the further process of modeling. The HEXP, FEXP, and CEXP were combined to a higher-order 
latent variable EXP, whereas the non-experimental variables HNEXP, FNEXP, and CNEXP were 
combined to a higher-order NEXP. Both, the higher-order EXP and NEXP, were statistically 
meaningful. The EXP represented the common variance of HEXP, FEXP, and CEXP. As in line with 
previous research on the structure of attention, such higher-order variables of attention most 
likely represent what is common to all measures of attention, hence, the EXP can be considered 
as a measure of perceptual attention (Moosbrugger et al. 2006; Schweizer, 2010; Schweizer et 
al., 2005).  
 In contrast, the NEXP did represent a conglomerate of the time taken by the residual 
processes not influenced by the experimental manipulation of complexity. Based on the 
circumstance of being a conglomerate, it was difficult to determine the content of the NEXP. In 
previous fixed-links studies, the NEXP was referred to as the auxiliary processes or the constant 
processes representing individual differences in basic (i.e., task-independent) processing speed 
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(Schweizer, 2007; Stauffer et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). In the study by Schweizer (2007), the 
latency-based Exchange Test - a test measuring the speed with which a certain number of 
cognitive elements can be exchanged and temporarily stored - was fixed-links modeled. 
Schweizer stated that the EXP represented the speed with which cognitive exchange and storage 
processes are executed, whereas the NEXP represented the speed with which basal perceptual 
and motor processes are executed. Furthermore, Schweizer saw the effect of the latency-based 
NEXP on intelligence as evidence for the mental speed approach to intelligence. However, due 
to being a conglomerate of multiple residual processes, the content of the NEXP can hardly be 
determined, hence, the NEXP is open for interpretation within the nomological network 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) of the respective study.  
 Thomas and colleagues (2015) noted that the NEXP might represent aspects of an 
individual’s current mental state such as fatigue or motivation. The notion of the NEXP as a 
container of constant processes such as motivation or fatigue seems to be reasonable, because 
these two processes are intended to be held constant in an experimental setting by applying 
breaks or providing the identical motivational basis for all subjects. However, for prolonged 
testing it might be possible that variations in fatigue or motivation increase/decrease the 
performance in latency-based assessment of information processing (Humphreys & Revelle, 
1984; Langner, Steinborn, Chatterjee, Sturm, & Willmes, 2010; Lisper & Kjellberg, 1972). If so, 
these processes might be alternatively explained by an increasing or a decreasing trajectory 
according to FLM. On all accounts, the content of the NEXP remains a conglomerate of several 
cognitive processes and further research is necessary to clarify its content by curtailing processes 
captured by it. Therefore, the results related to the NEXP are of an explorative character and 
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cautiously discussed in the context of the nomological network of the present and previous 
studies.  
5.2.4 Mediation analysis 
 Within the framework of the mediator model, the EXP and NEXP were specified as 
parallel mediators in between the relationship of TRP and g (see Figure 16). Considering the 
intricacy of this higher-order model with two parallel mediators, the model fit was satisfactory. 
All predictive paths were substantial, except the predictive path from the NEXP to g was not 
significant. Furthermore, the residual correlation between the EXP and the NEXP was also not 
significant.  
 Both indirect effects were not significant, since the bootstrapped pCIs did include the 
zero. As a result, the EXP representing perceptual attention as well as the NEXP representing the 
non-experimental processes did not mediate the relationship between TRP and g. In addition, 
when comparing the direct path of the mediation model (βc´) to the direct path of the single 
predictor model (βc) with no mediators contained, the direct effect from TRP to g remained a 
strong effect (βc = .60 versus βc´ = .57). As a matter of fact, the relationship between TRP and g 
within the mediation model (βc´ = .57) was still among the strongest found throughout the TRP 
literature (Helmbold, Troche, & Rammsayer, 2007). This finding demonstrates the genuine and 
robust nature of the relationship between TRP and g. Therefore, the present finding supports the 
notion that TRP represents a basic property of the central nervous system that accounts for 
individual differences in intelligence. 
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Indirect effect ab1 – the interplay between TRP, perceptual attention, and g 
 According to Michon (1985), temporal processing of brief intervals is of perceptual 
nature and supposedly not accessible to cognitive control. Therefore, the most likely type of 
attention to mediate the relationship between TRP and g is of perceptual nature as 
operationalized with the EXP. Furthermore, on the correlational level, the EXP showed to be 
moderately correlated with TRP and strongly with g (see Figure 14). These correlational findings 
were in line with previous research, which suggested that attention is involved in temporal 
information processing (Brown, 2008b) as well as non-temporal information processing (Carroll, 
1993; Schweizer et al., 2005). In addition to the correlation analysis, TRP showed to be a 
substantial predictor of EXP, whereas EXP showed to be a substantial predictor of g, suggesting 
that there might be a potential mediating effect as by the rationale of the casual steps approach 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). However, as reported and discussed, the EXP did not mediate the 
relationship between TRP and g. Consequently, perceptual attention does not account for the 
relationship between TRP and g, even though the results from the correlation analysis and the 
predictor models suggested that this might be the case. 
 The finding of non-mediation does only clarify the role of perceptual attention in the 
context of the TRP hypothesis. However, as shown in previous research, WM conceptualized as 
general capacity-limited system mediated the relationship between TRP and speed-related as 
well as capacity-related aspects of intelligence (Troche & Rammsayer, 2009b). As presented in 
the introduction, WM is described as attention-controlled cognitive processing and most 
prevalent models of WM contain some form of attentional WM component amongst other WM 
components such as short-term memory or storage components (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
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Conway et al., 2002; Engle et al., 1999; Süss et al., 2002). Therefore, it might be possible that 
top-down executive attention derived from capacity-limited WM measures might account for the 
relationship between TRP and g. The efficiency of controlled attention or the ability to 
successfully inhibit interfering information might be of key importance for the perception of 
durations and their comparisons. Furthermore, the comparison of different durations might 
involve WM-specific short-term memory functions, especially in the case of TG, in which the 
standard duration has to be actively maintained in WM. However, to the present state of 
knowledge, no studies exist on the influence of executive attention on TG or TOJ. Additionally, 
a systematic examination of WM-based executive attention and efficiency of short-term memory 
in the context of the TRP hypothesis is missing.  
Indirect effect ab2 – the interplay between TRP, the non-experimental processes, and g 
 The content of the non-experimental variables of the ECTs as well as the content of the 
NEXP cannot be determined unambiguously, because these variables represent a conglomerate 
of all non-experimental processes, that is, the variability in RTs not caused by the experimental 
manipulation of complexity. Previous literature suggested that the non-experimental variable 
represents general (i.e., task-independent) processing speed (Schweizer, 2007; Stauffer et al., 
2014). The nomological network of the present study conveys some evidence for the notion that 
the NEXP might represent a general SIP variable. First, the NEXP showed a small correlation to 
g (see Figure 14), which is in line with previous results within the mental speed approach to 
intelligence showing that correlations between simple RTs and intelligence are rather low (e.g., 
Neubauer et al., 1997; Sheppard & Vernon, 2008). Second, the insignificant indirect effect ab2 
fits with the results presented in the mediational analysis by Helmbold and colleagues (2007), 
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which suggested that TRP is the more important predictor of g than a general latent variable of 
SIP (derived from several Hick parameters). In the present study and the study by Helmbold and 
colleagues, TRP appeared to be sufficient to account for the effects relating SIP to g. However, 
as explained before, the interpretation of the NEXP as a general SIP variable has to be taken with 
caution, because a multitude of different unidentified cognitive processes contribute to the 
variance of the NEXP.  
5.3 General conclusion: integration of the research questions 
 The results of the present study showed that the relationship between TRP and g is robust 
and of genuine nature. The single predictor model (RQ1) showed that the TRP hypothesis was 
reproducible. Furthermore, the mediation analysis (RQ2) showed that perceptual attention as 
well as the conglomerate of all non-experimental processes were not capable of mediating the 
relationship between TRP and g. In addition, despite that two parallel mediators were used, one 
of them representing a manifold conglomerate of potential mediating processes, the relationship 
between TRP and g was not mediated and remained a strong relationship. In summary, the 
present findings confirm that TRP is a reliable and substantial determinant of individual 
differences in general intelligence. 
5.4 Study limitations 
 Several potential limitations of the present study were identified. First, it was not possible 
to examine whether perceptual attention (or the NEXP) exerted a different mediating effect for 
high and low intelligent individuals. Unfortunately, the sample of the present study was too small 
to perform the mediation analysis for these two subsamples separately. Furthermore, even if the 
present sample would have been big enough to be split, there are no norms provided for the 
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modified short version of the BIS test to determine the validity of the sample split (cf. Jäger et 
al., 1997). 
 Second, FLM is a promising approach to dissociate experimentally manipulated variance 
from non-experimental variance. However, despite the theory-driven fixation of factor loadings, 
the fixation of factor loadings within the theoretically expected trajectory remains somehow 
arbitrary. For example, an increasing trajectory might vary in many different ways and there is 
no standard procedure in the fixation of factor loadings. Therefore, the theoretically expected 
trajectory has to be modeled repeatedly with different factor fixations in order to identify the 
appropriate factor loadings. 
 Third, the psychophysical timing task used as indicators of TRP were primarily in the 
auditory modality, except for the bimodal TOJ, whereas all measures of perceptual attention 
were in the visual modality. There is considerable evidence for faster and more accurate 
information processing in the auditory compared to the visual domain (as discussed by Stauffer, 
Haldemann, Troche, & Rammsayer, 2012). Therefore, the auditory-based assessment of TRP 
might have been more accurate than the visual-based assessment of perceptual attention. 
5.5 Future directions  
 In the present study, attention was conceptualized as limited information processing 
resource depending on perceptual processes. As presented in the introduction and the discussion 
on the indirect effect ab1, Troche and Rammsayer (2009b) showed that the relationship between 
TRP and capacity- as well as speed-related aspects of intelligence was mediated by WM 
capacity, of which executive attention can be considered a subcomponent (e.g., Kane et al., 2004; 
Miyake & Shah, 1999). Therefore, it would be interesting to examine what specific WM 
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subcomponent (e.g., executive attention and/or short-term memory) accounted for the mediation 
found in Troche and Rammsayer to further elucidate the role of (executive) attention in the 
context of the TRP hypothesis. 
 Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine whether perceptual attention also exerts 
no effect in mediation analyses for different subsamples (e.g., different sexes, age groups, or for 
low and high intelligent individuals). The idea of subsampling has also to be considered when 
investigating the potential mediating role of executive attention in the context of the TRP 
hypothesis so that sufficiently big samples can be accomplished. 
 A further topic to be examined, which has been discussed in the presented study and in 
previous work using FLM (e.g., Thomas et al., 2015), is the content of the NEXP. It has never 
been systematically examined what the NEXP represents or what the NEXP does not represent. 
For latency-based FLM designs, it would be important to evaluate whether the NEXP can be 
considered a general SIP variable or if this consideration has to be withdrawn. For this purpose, 
the fixed-links variables derived from classical ECTs, will have to be related to variables 
representing basal speed measures as well as variables representing current mental states such as 
fatigue or motivation. It would be of advantage for the individual differences research on 
intelligence, mental speed, and attention, if the processes contained in the NEXP can be 
curtailed. 
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6 Summary 
Previous research showed repeatedly that individual differences in the temporal 
resolution power (TRP) of the central nervous system are related to individual differences in 
general intelligence. This relationship became to be known as the TRP hypothesis. However, the 
TRP hypothesis was challenged by the fact that temporal as well as non-temporal neural 
information processing afford considerable attentional resources and, hence, the relationship 
between TRP and general intelligence might be explained alternatively by attention as common 
source of variance. Therefore, the present study aimed to arrive at a better understanding of the 
interplay among TRP, attention, and general intelligence. For this purpose, a latent variable 
approach was used to dissociate attention-paced speed variance in latency-based measures of 
attention from all residual-based, non-experimental speed variance. That way, two potential 
mediators were derived, one representing a pure measure of perceptual attention and the other 
representing a conglomerate of the non-experimental processes not associated with the 
experimental manipulation of attention. A bootstrapped mediation analysis revealed that both 
mediators were not capable of mediating the relationship between TRP and general intelligence, 
hence, the present finding confirmed that TRP is a reliable and substantial determinant of 
individual differences in general intelligence. Future studies have to clarify the potential 
mediating role of more executive aspects of attention in order to elucidate the role of attention as 
an integral phenomena in the context of the TRP hypothesis.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Subjects removed from the initial raw sample 
 From the initial raw sample of 243 subjects, 10 subjects were removed due to the 
following reasons. One subject was removed due to insufficient knowledge of the German 
language, even though the subject reported to be a native speaker. Three subjects reported to 
exceed the predefined age range of 18 to 30 years. Subjects younger than 18 years and older than 
30 years were not admitted since age-related changes in cognitive and motor processes can affect 
RTs (Fry & Hale, 1996; Kramer & Madden, 2008; Sleimen-Malkoun et al., 2013). One subject 
reported to have misunderstood the instructions of the BIS memory subtest paired associates 
(ZP) and therefore marked random answers in that subtest. Five subjects showed incorrect test 
behavior during testing session such as confusing response buttons.  
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Appendix B: A detailed description of the sample 
 Seventy-three subjects out of the 131 subjects with an academic background were women 
(mean and standard deviation of age: 22.44 ± 3.05 years) and 58 were men (22.91 ± 2.72 years). 
Most of the academic subjects studied psychology (64%). The other most frequently mentioned 
fields of studies were teacher education (6%), economics (6%), and law (6%). Forty-five subjects 
out of the 97 subjects with a vocational background were women (20.93 ± 2.68 years) and 52 
were men (21.42 ± 2.89 years). The most frequently mentioned vocational backgrounds were 
merchant (8%), gastronomy employee (8%), and nurse (6%). The remaining jobs were manifold: 
flight attendant, polygraph, hair dresser, optician, fashion adviser, photographer, dental care, 
mechanic, and many more. Out of all 228 subjects, 207 subjects reported to be right-handed, 20 
subjects reported to be left-handed, and one subject reported to be both.  
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Appendix C: Intraindividual outlier correction for Hick, Flanker, and CPT, and interindividual 
outlier correction for DDE, TG, and TOJ 
 
 
Figure C
.1. Intraindividual outlier correction as reported in chapter 4.1 for the H
ick, the Flanker, and 
the C
PT conditions. W
ithin each scatter plot, all correct trials of all subjects are plotted. The x-axis 
indicates all these trials, w
hereas the y-axis indicates the R
T of each trial. The low
er horizontal line 
in each scatter plot is the 100 m
s physiological lim
it of the speed of reaction, w
hereas the upper 
horizontal line is the visually identified upper lim
it. For each H
ick condition, the upper lim
it w
as 
2,500 m
s. For each Flanker condition, the upper lim
it w
as 4,000 m
s. For each C
PT condition, the 
upper lim
it w
as 1,200 m
s. A
ll trials below
 the low
er lim
it and all trials above the upper lim
it w
ere 
rem
oved before the further outlier correction described in chapter 4.1. In F5*, C
PT2, and C
PT3, all 
congruent/distractor trials w
ere rem
oved before the outlier inspection, thus, the em
pty space betw
een 
the target trials.  
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Figure C.2. Interindividual outlier correction as 
reported in chapter 4.1 for DDE, TG, and TOJ. The 
x-axis indicates the subject, whereas the y-axis 
indicates the respective performance measure: 
difference limen for DDE, dispersion index for TG, 
and mean SOA for TOJ. Subjects exceeding the 
interindividual mean by three interindividual 
standard deviations (indicated by the horizontal line) 
were considered as outliers and removed from the 
further analyses. 
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Appendix D: Error rates for Hick and Flanker as well as omission and false alarm rates for CPT 
 
 
 
Table D.1
Performance 
measure  Trials    Mean      SD min max   Skewness  Kurtosis
Shapiro-
Wilk 
p -value
Hick
H0 32 - - - - - - -
H1 32 0.00 0.01 0 0.06 3.30 10.78 < .001
H2 32 0.02 0.02 0 0.12 1.14 1.84 < .001
Flanker
F1 32 - - - - - - -
F2 32 0.03 0.04 0 0.22 1.74 3.97 < .001
F5* 32 0.06 0.06 0 0.32 1.40 1.79 < .001
CPT omission
CPT1 32 0.01 0.03 0 0.16 2.56 8.40 < .001
CPT2 24 0.00 0.01 0 0.08 5.02 25.60 < .001
CPT3 24 0.02 0.05 0 0.38 3.96 20.26 < .001
CPT false alarm
CPT1 32 - - - - - - -
CPT2 96 0.01 0.01 0 0.05 1.91 4.96 < .001
CPT3 216 0.01 0.01 0 0.12 3.61 24.84 < .001
Percentage
Error rates for the Hick and the Flanker conditions as well as the omission and the false alarm 
rates for the CPT conditions
Note . The second column "Trials" indicates the number of trials on which the error percentage is 
based on. Errors (i.e., pressing the wrong response button) were not possible in H0 and F1. The CPT 
omission rate indicates the missed imperative stimuli. The CPT false alarm rate indicates the 
distractor stimuli falsely identified as imperative stimulus. CPT = continuous performance test; H0-H2 
= Hick conditions; F1-F5* = Flanker conditions; CPT1-CPT3 = CPT conditions; SWT = Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test.
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Appendix E: A comparison of the g factors scores of different g models  
g
BISBISBIS BISBISBIS BISBISBIS
Model g2
BISBISBIS BISBISBIS BISBISBIS
g
BISBISBIS BISBISBIS BISBISBIS
Model g3
BISBISBIS BISBISBIS BISBISBIS
Processing 
speed
Processing 
capacity Memory
BISBIS BISBISBIS
Model g4
BISBISBIS BIS
Figural Verbal Numeric
Processing 
speed
Processing 
capacity Memory
g
BISBIS BISBISBIS BISBISBIS BIS
Processing 
speed
Processing 
capacity Memory
g
Model g5
BISBIS BIS
g
Model g1
 
 
 
 
 
Table E.1      
Correlations among the g factor scores of the different g models and the z-
score 
 Model g2 Model g3 Model g4 Model g5 z-score 
Model g1 .98*** .91*** .92*** .96*** .99*** 
Note. Models are explained in the caption of Figure E.1. z-score = the mean of all 
z-standardized BIS subtests. 
***p < .001. 
 
Figure E.1. For validity reasons, the g model used for the present study based on the three 
aggregate scores of processing speed, processing capacity, and memory (Model g1) was compared 
to more complex g models. Therefore, g factor scores were extracted from all models presented 
in Figure E.1 and correlated. The content of the indicators used varied from model to model: the 
18 indicators of Model g2 and g3 are based on the 18 z-standardized subtest scores, whereas the 
nine indicators of Model g4 and g5 are based on operation cell means. The models depicted in 
Figure E.1 are greatly simplified. 
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Appendix F: Non-parametric manipulation check of complexity 
 For the Hick paradigm, the Friedman rank sum test revealed a significant total effect of 
complexity, χ2(2) = 452.04, p < .001. The Friedman post-hoc tests (Galili, 2010) showed that all 
three Hick conditions differed significantly from each other (p < .001). For both, the Flanker and 
the CPT task, the Friedman test showed that the manipulation of complexity worked as well, 
χ2(2) = 456, p < .001. The identical χ2-values for both ECTs are due to the identical RT-courses 
for each of the 228 subjects (i.e., all subjects showed the same increasing trajectory of RTs 
across conditions in Flanker and CPT: mean RT of condition 1 < mean RT of condition 2 < mean 
RT of condition 3). The Friedman post-hoc tests revealed that all three Flanker and all three CPT 
conditions differed significantly from each other (p < .001). Therefore, the non-parametric 
manipulation check revealed the same result as the parametric manipulation check.  
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Appendix G: Bootstrapped distributions of the indirect effects 
 The bootstrapped distribution of the 4795 estimates of βab1 and βab2 are displayed in 
Figure G.1. The lower (pCI2.5) and upper bound (pCI97.5) of the pCI and the unstandardized 
estimate of βab1 and βab2 are depicted within the respective histogram 
Figure G.1. The bootstrapped distributions of the unstandardized 
indirect effects βab1 (upper histogram) and βab2 (lower histogram). 
For both indirect effects the upper and lower bound of the 
percentile CI (pCI) is depicted within the histogram.  
 
pCI2.5 = -.95 βab1  = -.14 pCI97.5  = .01
pCI2.5 = -.06 βab1  = .17 pCI97.5  = .57
